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Abstract  
In the last few years, the party group defined as the radical right have risen in popularity across 
the nations of Europe. The research in this field is impressive yet many assume that these party 
simply represent a xenophobic view as a reaction to the recent waves of immigrants fleeing war 
or social injustice in Africa and middle east but what is xenophobia if not a lack of social, 
general, trust? The research in this field is limited with only a few studies that have taken it into 
consideration. This paper analyses the impact of uneven distribution in education and elderly 
care funding to assess the impact of partiality in welfare institutions on the vote share of the 
populist radical right. The study compares 276 municipalities in Sweden and assesses the aver-
age municipal expenditures on welfare relative to the national average. The result suggests that 
in municipalities where the expenditures are below the national average, support for the 
PRRWP have increased between 2010 and 2014. 
 
Key words: General trust, Welfare state, Sweden, Radical right, Welfare expenditure, Partiality 
in welfare, Partial trust, PRRWP 
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Introduction 
Over the last few years, immigration have given birth to a heated debate in Europe. We can see 
how it have sawn a split between the countries of the EU and was an often mentioned argument 
for the realization of the Brexit before the referendum in the United Kingdoms. The past few 
years have also seen the rise of the radical right, a group of political parties that now exists in 
most countries and many hold sets in national parliaments. These have been connected to at 
least two issues of significant for the international community, anti-EU sentiments and a strong 
nativist position that speaks out against immigration and argues in favour of the universal wel-
fare system. (Eger & Valdez, 2015) The link between the radical right and welfare is a phenom-
enon that, while studied, have been given less attention than many other areas. Most often, the 
research on the radical right have looked at demand side variables that measure factors that 
make people more likely to vote for the radical right, such as immigration, crime rates, unem-
ployment and varying sociodemographic factors. Alternatively, researchers have focused on 
supply side variables that look at the potential effect of election systems, political factors and 
the ideologies and strategies of the radical right parties themselves. Few have looked at the 
implications of the welfare state, and those that have has mostly done so from a theoretical 
perspective of welfare chauvinism. (Kitschelt, 1995) Only a handful have targeted the other 
side of welfare which have been linked to the generation of social capital and generalized social 
trust. (Rothstein, 1998) Those that have made the connection between the mitigating factor of 
security generated by universal welfare systems and decreased support for the radical right. 
(Swank & Betz, 2003) Others have particularly studied the mitigating effect of social capital 
and while some have found that it decreases support for the radical right(Coffé et al., 2007), 
others have found that it have no effect. (Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler, 2009) This paper will 
add to the literature by combining the research of universal welfare and trust by measuring the 
impact of unequal welfare state expenditures on the sub-national level. Sweden in particular is 
known both for its universal welfare system and generally above average general trust, yet even 
here have we seen the rapid rise in popularity of the radical right. The main force of the radical 
right in Sweden consists of one political party, the Sweden Democrats(SD). They have risen 
rapidly in popularity from 2.9 % in 2006 to 12.9% in 2014. (Loxbo, 2015; Erlingsson, Loxbo 
& Öhrvall, 2012) Currently, national poles place them at 17.3%. (PSU, 2016) The party com-
bines left/right authoritarianism with a focus on nativist policies that I refer to as populist radical 
right wing. (Loxbo, 2015: 180) In particular, the party have been argued to stand for a ethno-
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nationalistic welfare system which corresponds with a general trend among the radical right. 
(Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015) The fact that welfare is central for the Swedish case, both in 
practise and in nationalist rhetoric, can be explained by the strong connection between Swedish 
identity and the universal welfare state with the founding of the “people’s home “(folkhemmet) 
in the 1920’s. An ideological position that have been argued for almost a century. (Hellström, 
Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012: 194-197) Thus making a good case for testing a welfare state based 
hypothesis.  
 
In the paper, I strive to answer the question “What the impact of the welfare state is on the 
electoral support of the PRRWP?” In particular, I aim to investigate whether the difference in 
the amount of welfare provisions (partial welfare) is linked with the varying degrees of electoral 
support received by PRRWPs? 
 
By asking this question, I aim to add to the research on the relationship between PRRWP and 
public welfare. In particular, I aim to add the idea of partiality in public institutions to the 
field. A topic which I have been unable to find any previous research about. The outcome of 
the paper could potentially offer a wider understanding as to what effects the shifting role of 
the state have had on the rise of the PRRWP. A topic which today is primarily dominated by a 
population diversity paradigm where immigration is the main focus, yet few ask themselves 
why the immigration issue have been given so much room in the debate. I believe that uneven 
distribution may offer an explanation to this particular issue. 
 
The results show a strong and promising correlation between variations in welfare provisions 
and the support for the PRRWP which open up for further studies. The rest of the paper will 
begin by identifying the characteristics of the PRRWP. That is followed by the literature re-
view of research on the PRRWP in general and the welfare state and generalized trust in par-
ticular. In chapter 2 I construct the theoretical arguments for why welfare and PRRWP should 
correlate with each other based on theories on general and particularized trust. Chapter 3 con-
tains both case selection and methodology. Chapter 4 contains the analysis followed by a 
short discussion and conclusions in chapter 5. 
 
1 Previous research 
The following chapter defines and conceptualizes the main theoretical concepts, and then pro-
vides the literature review and formulates the three hypotheses.  
 
1.1 What is the radical right? 
The research in the field of extreme right research is simply massive. A significant boost in 
popularity with the rise of French Front National in the 80’s led to a massive rise in the field. 
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However, as pointed out by several authors, there is dissonance in how this party group is con-
ceptualised. (Mudde, 2007: 11. 12; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007: 405) A few examples 
of the plethora of concepts used to describe the parties categorized as far right are anti-immi-
grant (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005; Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011; Bolin et al. 2014), 
populist radical right (Pauwels, 2010), extreme right-wing (Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers, 
2002; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002; Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler, 2009; Giugni & Koopmans, 
2007), extreme right parties(Golder, 2003.A; Arzheimer, 2009) radical right parties (Hellström, 
Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009), radical right-wing populist(Van Der 
Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Swank & Betz, 2003; Rydgren, 2007), right wing populists (Oesch, 
2008; Muller et al. 2014; Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2014), new radical right(Kitschelt, 
1995; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005), Neo-nationalist (Eger & Valdez, 2015), Right-wing extrem-
ism (Knigge, 1998), far right-wing (Lacassen & Lubbers, 2012), neo-fascist (Fenner & Weitz 
2004; Karapin 1998) and racist (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014). As has been pointed out previ-
ously by Pauwels, (2010: 270) this issue is not aided by that some authors apply different terms 
interchangeably throughout their work (see Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007: 407, 412, 415; 
Müller et al, 2014: 42) As is, it seems necessary to first identify a reasonable point of departure, 
how should we conceptualise the radical right? 
 
To identify a point of entry to the extreme right, we should first differentiate them from other 
forms of political parties. The clearest differentiation is between those of mainstream and pop-
ulist parties. The concept of mainstream parties applies to a form of political party that is nor-
malized within the political system. As such, a mainstream party may offer up populist policies, 
but they are still the representation of the established political elite and thus remain mainstream. 
(Golder, 2003. A.: 447). What is important when using the concept populism, is that there are 
two forms, either ideology or strategy. (Mudde, 2007: 23) When we refer to populist radical 
right parties, we refer to them on the basis of ideology. As mentioned previous, any party can 
have a populist strategy, but not as an ideology. The basis of which stands an inherent position 
that argues to be a representative of “the true people”. Standing against a corrupt political elite. 
(Rydgren, 2005: 12; Swank & Betz, 2003: 218) Of the two, the parties defined to belong on the 
extreme right seems to be adequately positioned among the populist parties. However, if used 
carelessly, such a conceptualisation alone may affect the way we can, and will, approach the 
object of inquiry. If stuck on the implication of populism alone. Too much explanatory power 
may be attributed to the impact of “protest voting” and attractive charismatic leaders. Both 
critique and empirical evidence have been presented in recent studies that go against such pre-
sumptions however. (Arzheimer, 2009; Betz, 1994; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009; Van der 
Brug & Mughan, 2007) Others have found support for it (Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011). A 
few authors have argued that while labelled populism, the correct way to consider the impact 
of protest voting may in reality be an established ideological position which in turn explains the 
extreme right vote. But as an ideological standpoint it is no different than any other position 
and as such, rational choice based on political preference and thus, not an example of populist 
behaviour (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2009.A; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 482). As 
such we can conclude that only relaying on the term populist right-wing may potentially be 
misleading.  
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The next step of importance is the difference between neo-fascism and the radical right. Ignazi 
argues that the extreme right and fascism split paths in the 1980’s, the extreme right took the 
form of right-wing conservatism that took up the idea of cultural differentiations between the 
national and the foreign based on cultural differences. (Ignazi, 2003: 19-26) Authors have 
shown that their voters hold significantly different values (Golder.2003. A.; Carter, 2005) and 
it have been shown that inherited relations to neo-fascist movements may impede on the success 
of the radical right. (Widfeldt, 2008; Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011: 436) Many authors argue 
that an important barrier between the radical right and the neo-fascist camp where the radical 
right is considered democratic, to a relative degree, while the latter is considered to represent 
anti-democratic ideals more often connected to violence or the disregard for the sovereignty of 
the people. (Mudde, 2007: 31; Kitschelt, 1995: 30; Golder, 2003.A.:446, 47) The reasons to 
separate these seem quite clear, however it’s still common that authors miss, or ignore the sep-
aration of the two. For example, in Eger & Valdez, 2015, they identify the Greek political party 
Golden Dawn in a new group of radical right parties they identify as neo-nationalist based on 
three shared political positions. 1. Anti-EU, 2. anti-immigration and 3. pro-social welfare 
spending on the in-group. (Edger & Valdez, 2015: 117) However similar, an in-depth study of 
the party suggests clear neo-fascist positions similar to other neo-fascist movements in the UK 
and the U.S. (Dinas et al. 2016) 
 
One of the terms most commonly used when describing this group of parties is anti-immigrant. 
Proponents of this categorization argues that although there potentially are other issues that 
these parties approach, the anti-immigration policy represents the most significant (Boom-
gaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007: 407; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 474). Others have criti-
cised this position in particular, but also the conceptualisation of niche, or one-issue parties in 
general (Formisano, 2005: 249, 250; Pauwels, 2010: 270; Giugni & Koopmans, 2007: 488). 
The principle of one-issue parties, or niche parties, have long been discussed and criticized in 
the field (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005: 148). Meguid (2008) in her book identified the radical 
right as another in a line of niche party groups, following the same line as the greens in the 70’s 
and the ethno-nationalist parties in the 60’s. Essential for the niche parties is that they gain 
influence by focusing on a particular issue which is in the periphery of the political agenda. But 
in return the party will, essentially, stay focused on a small set of issues and will always be 
perceived to always represent the one issue by its voters (Ibid: 4, 5). The niche party will serve 
as a third point of political positioning outside of the spatial left-right scale. To adopt, the main-
stream parties may either adopt an accommodative or adversarial tactic (Ibid: 26-29). At this 
point, critique has been lobbied at the theory on niche parties on the basis that the actions of the 
mainstream parties should position the niche party on the left-right scale based on what position 
each side have, thus preserving the importance of the scale, also for niche parties. However, the 
same authors also acknowledge that this is not stated by Meguid herself (Van der Brug & Fen-
nema, 2009). Unfortunately, the authors, in their critique, forget to calculate for the possibility 
that both sides may choose adversarial tactics, at which case the left-right scale should become 
7 
 
indifferent to the voters that still support it, thus making their findings to go in line with ex-
pected outcomes (Ibid: 603). The materialization of such a situation could be conceived from 
the cases of Austria (Fallend & Heinisch, 2016) and Sweden (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011) 
where all mainstream parties originally took a dismissive(adversarial) position. However, many 
other studies have found grounds to reject the niche party principle. Everything based on that 
voters for the extreme right, opposite to the theoretical argument by Meguid, does value other 
sides of the agenda and not necessarily relate to the anti-immigrant position in first hand 
(Mudde, 1999; Eger & Valdez, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2001). The final argument against the use 
of one-issue party identifications is the impact it can have on the prospective outcome of our 
studies. If we perceive anti-immigration as the main proponent of these parties, then we may 
potentially bias our results with variables that directly link to immigration sentiments. I agree 
with Formisano in his argument that the concept needs to be deconstructed to understand it. 
Although it implies a negative attitude against immigration, it does not necessarily need to be 
due to intolerance or hate, but also from fear of or uncertainty to that which is foreign 
(Formisano, 2005: 249, 250). 
  
So far, we know that the radical right is defined as populist, however it is not neo-fascist, so it 
is anti-establishment, but not anti-democratic. It is not a niche party. And so, the increase in 
support for the radical right may potentially be observed due to other effects than xenophobia 
or anti-immigrant sentiment. However, one question remains, “Is it right?” Kitschelt (1995) 
argued in his influential theory, that the “new” radical right could be conceptualized in a “master 
case”. The master case was to combine authoritarian-paternalistic policies and market capital-
ism. Thus, by adding a cultural dimension to party politics, separating the libertarian and cul-
turally authoritarian parties apart. Further, he suggests that economically, on the spatial left-
right scale. The radical right places at the far right (Kitschelt, 1995: 19, 20). But 7 years later 
the theory was changed slightly as Kitschelt admitted that his previous argument no longer held 
true (McGann & Kitschelt, 2005). Now, the radical right was moving left. Theoretically, he 
argued that his previous model had been correct, but bound to the relative spatial limitation of 
time. Furthermore, an internal evolutionary process had occurred which had moved the party 
left on the scale so as to position itself close to the centre, but without going so far as to cause 
small business owners to feel that they let go of their right-wing economical position. But still 
far enough to encompass leftist welfare policies that attracted the working class (McGann & 
Kitschelt, 2005). The “shift to the left” argument found further empirical support (Arzheimer, 
2008: 176; Muis & Scholte, 2013; Oskarson & Demker, 2015: 641, 642). The link between the 
radical right and the welfare state is one that is highly debated and acknowledged in contempo-
rary studies. Nordensvard & Ketola (2015) suggest that the combination ethnocentric welfare 
policies and nationalism have given birth to a new phenomenon they call the welfare nation 
state. A form of policy where the radical right parties interlink the nation building process and 
an ethnocentric vie won the access to welfare services that argues that only the citizens of the 
ruling majority should have access to these civic institutions. Eger & Valdez (2015) and their 
concept of neo-nationalism have already been brought up previously. But it to represent a recent 
study that categorizes the radical right to hold integral welfare-expansionist policies.  
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The prospect of conceptualising the radical right as a racist party is raised by Mulinari & 
Neergaard (2014). I consider this point to be of both methodological and ethical significance 
and thus believe that it is a point that should be raised. Firstly, methodologically, it falls under 
the same category as anti-immigration party in that it conforms to a one-issue conceptualisation. 
Thus raising the issue of limiting the understanding of the radical right supporters once again. 
Secondly, the researchers claim that the position of the people in their study is racist, opposite 
of the expressed view of the people themselves. This raises a question of research ethics. By 
this I mean that if we as researchers should ascribe negatively, or positively, charged subject 
positions to people involved in our research while they themselves have expressed their position 
to be radically different to that which the researchers claim. To what level can we as researchers 
interpret our results and what conclusions can, and should, we draw from it. Particularly if the 
interpretation may have negative effects for the concerned in the future. There is research that 
link right-wing authoritarianism to different kinds of “new” or subtitle, or “old” or blatant, rac-
ism (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005; McFarland, 2010). However, this link does not represent a 
causal relationship that explains every case of social, or general, prejudice. As such, if combined 
with the argument by Formisano (2005), simply using the term racism to describe the electorate 
and its members may lead to highly charged yet inaccurate description of individual positions. 
Thirdly, it raises the question if racism as a term should be used at al. Mulinari & Neergaard 
argues that the growing body of research have gone to great lengths to avoid using the term 
racism to categorize the radical right parties where as they would identify them as cultural rac-
ists. (:53) The message is simple enough however I question the need to include the use of 
racism in academic papers. Not because it may be incorrect. Clearly, there are cases in which it 
can be applied. However, the word itself reflect and reproduce a perverse construction of soci-
etal norms and ideologies without any form of empirical substance. As such, although we may 
possible claim that radical right parties, such as the Swedish Democrats, act in a way that at-
tempts to “race-ify” culture. However, we should ask ourselves if the inclusion of racism in 
academic papers will work against it, or if it will work to concretize and legitimize the concept 
into common use. Due to these arguments, I consider that the use of the term racist would be 
counterintuitive to my ideological position and the goal of the research conducted in this paper. 
 
To recap and summarize the previous section, we can now conclude that the identity of a radical 
right party is identified by an anti-establishment, or populist, ideology. It has an authoritarian 
position on culture and have shifted its economical position from far right to centre right due to 
an, over time, change in the attitude to welfare expenditures. As is, I will therefore not use the 
concepts of populist or extreme right, nor racist or anti-immigration party. I will instead, from 
here on out use the term populist radical right-wing party (PRRWP). This term is the same as 
in the definition used by Mudde (2007). However, it is important to note that these definitions 
are different from each other. While I borrow many of the main theoretical positions from his 
theoretical construction, Mudde’s construct is much more complex and offer more subtle dif-
ferences in the construction, and differentiation, of the concept. Initially however, Mudde uses 
a good categorization of what the term “radical” should be defined as which I to will concede 
9 
 
to. Mudde argues that opposite to the radical as the extreme end, we should consider the radical 
position to represent the anti-establishment and pro-authoritarianism position of the radical 
right as an opposite to central liberal values, more specifically political pluralism and the pro-
tection of minorities. (Mudde, 2007: 24, 25) In the following section, I will first define a com-
mon set of categories to categorize previous research in the field of right wing populism in 
combination with other theories in order to conceptualize a framework. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
The width of research in the field of the radical right does not necessarily mean that all areas 
are equally well understood. Bolin et al. (2014) argues that more research should focus on the 
effects PRRWP’s have once they enter the government as the reasons for their rise and success 
by now is relatively well understood. (:336) Others, like Mudde (2007) argues that too much 
focus is aimed at demand-side variables. Instead, more focus should be aimed at the supply side 
and in particular, the impact the PRRWPs have on their own success. This section will continue 
as follows. First, I will explain the difference between support and demand side variables. The 
second part will cover many of the topics of PRRWP research that have been studied before in 
order to make a weighted selection in chapter three where the list of control variables will be 
identified.  
 
The separation between demand and supply side variables is a methodologically advantageous 
categorization which separate the radical right research into three section. Demand-side varia-
bles cover micro, meso and macro level studies. These variables explain in which groups, or 
under which circumstances, there is a demand for PRRWP’s, and thus explain their increased 
support. Supply-side variables separate between the external and internal variables. The supply 
side, in general, covers the variables which links together available space in the political sphere 
and the rise of the PRRWP. The external variables cover such areas as issue salience, election 
system and political centralisation/convergence and others. The internal category of supply side 
variables focusses on the impact and influence of the PRRWP itself. These variables cover 
aspects of the parties’ internal structure, strategy and history. (Mudde, 2007) 
 
1.2.1 Demand-side research 
There are many demand side variables which have been included in PRRWP research. The 
spread of variables covers cultural, economic, socio-demographic and development factors. In 
the following chapter, I have attempted to separate and sort them into relevant categories. The 
cultural values relate to ethno-nationalism and identity. In this section, I will relate this to the 
impact of immigration1. Welfare and social capital are separated from other variables due to the 
significance of this factors in the paper. Socio-demographic factors, as well as economic factors 
are sorted under the label “other values” due to their interconnected nature.  
                                                          
1 To read more on the impact of cultural threats, see chapter 2.1: What is the radical right? 
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1.2.1.1 Welfare 
Welfare first appeared in Swank & Betz (2003). Their paper analysed the impact of the univer-
sal welfare state in mitigating the impact of globalisation and market-liberalisation by measur-
ing the increased support of PRRWP. This is done by comparing 16 countries with either a 
universalistic welfare system, categorized by comprehensive coverage of citizens, within risk 
categories, a generous social wage and well developed active labour market programs. Or a 
corporatist, conservative (and liberal) welfare system which is categorized either by generous 
occupationally based social coverage and insurance while having minimal social service provi-
sions. Alternatively, they can be recognized by a disproportional reliance on means-tested or 
private insurance and moderate to low levels of income replacements. (ibid: 224) Their findings 
suggested that a universalistic welfare system decreased support for PRRWPs in west European 
countries and that, while support for PRRWPs still increased with immigration, universal wel-
fare lowered the increase from 2.34 to 1.60 at an immigration level of 0.18 of the population. 
(Ibid: 235) Hypothetically, this is due to the nullification of the competition hypothesis when a 
strong welfare state can nullify the threat to social and economic security via social services 
and income redistribution. This relative to the threat that may be perceived by groups in a cor-
poratist welfare state system where some are better off than others. (ibid: 233) The mitigating 
impact have been found in other studies as well. Arzheimer (2009) found a curvilinear relation-
ship between PRRWP support and unemployment benefits. When benefits where high enough, 
unemployment no longer increased PRRWP support. An argument that have been used in micro 
level studies, to explain higher support for PRRWPs among young and old voters is that they 
more commonly rely on welfare functions such as elderly care or unemployment benefits. The 
influx of immigrants and asylum seeker thus become a perceived threat to their continuous 
wellbeing when they compete for the same resources. This have been called the “losers of mo-
dernity”2 explanation. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, Arzheimer, 2008) Rydgren & Ruth (2013) 
found that in election districts in Sweden, where the number of inhabitants that were depending 
on welfare benefits due to illness, PRRWP support were higher. (ibid: 723) An alternative ex-
planation is the “welfare chauvinism” concept which was developed by Kitschelt (1995: 22) 
This alternative explanation moves the focus from competition to selfishness and argues that 
people don’t mind income redistribution but argues that they do so from an ethnocentric point 
of view. Meaning that those already present matters more than those with tries to get in. Coffé, 
Hayndels & Vermeir (2007) found in their study of the Vlams Block in Belgium, that more 
prosperous areas where correlated with higher support, thus supporting the welfare chauvinism 
concept. This theoretical concept gains further support from Schmidt & Spies (2014) who found 
that support for the welfare system dropped when migration was part of the political discourse. 
Based on the discursive perspective, we may consider that the medial and political discourse 
effects could be similar in their effect on welfare and PRRWP support. Authors like Boom-
gaarden & Vliegenthart (2007) have found that media coverage have a significant relationship 
with PRRWP support. The effect has been seen in how media coverage creates issue salience 
in areas such as crime or immigration which have increased PRRWP support as they both keep 
an issue alive and pushes mainstream parties to take a position on the issue, which in turn have 
                                                          
2 A concept that imply that some have lost out due to the effect of globalization. These people are known as 
the “losers of modernity” and are supposedly disgruntled and highly likely to vote for the radical right. 
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been correlated with increased PRRWP support, particularly on the issue of immigration. (Dahl-
ström & Esaiasson, 2011, Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012, Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001). If 
we combine these findings with the writings of Nordensvard & Ketola (2015) that argue for 
that the PRRWP’s in Sweden and Finland have moved away from traditional forms of welfare 
state discourse to form a third, the “welfare nation state” which argue for a nativist welfare 
state which should prioritize natives only, while only offering limited support to non-natives. 
(Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015; Kpessa et al. 2011; Blyth 2002) This could be considered to 
attract those voters who believe that the welfare system is insufficient. This could in part explain 
the rise in PRRWP support in Sweden where Hellström, Nilsson & Stoltz (2012) found that the 
Sweden Democrats have linked reduced welfare quality to immigration. (ibid: 194-197) 
 
In the context of welfare expenditure, not all authors agree with Swank & Betz (2003). In their 
study, Veugeles & Magnan (2005) suggest that a large welfare state is equated with PRRWP 
support. However, compared with Swank & Betz. The measurements used by Veugeles & 
Magnan to cover the welfare state, public expenditure on social protection, is simple and covers 
only part of the welfare state. (Veugeles & Magnan, 2005: 840) Other areas which is included 
in Swank & Betz (2003) such as education and public health expenditures are seemingly ex-
cluded. Leaving a significant part of the variation outside of the model which could potentially 
affect the results of the study. Other studies have had mixed results when it comes to the impact 
of welfare states. Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler (2009) found that fiscal redistribution had a 
negative impact on PRRWP support when immigration was high, however their results were 
limited to two out of 144 regions, 8 out of 144 when including social capital as a moderator. 
Their conclusion is that while fiscal redistribution is effective at negating PRRWP support, it 
has to be at an adequate level. Further, unless social capital is high enough, welfare chauvinistic 
tendencies will make voters very of immigrants and increase their belief that they are misusing 
the welfare system. Thus increasing PRRWP support if social capital is low (ibid: 288). Over 
all, Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler in their findings ties the effect of the welfare state with the 
presence of social capital and social/interpersonal trust.  
 
In total, this offers us three explanations to the relationship between PRRWPs and welfare. 
Either it decreases support due to that it nullifies threats if it is sufficiently high and shares the 
burden evenly. Alternatively, it increases PRRWP support if services are insufficient or risk 
being insufficient due to a perceived competitiveness between locals and immigrants. Either 
from a “losers of modernity” perspective or from a “welfare chauvinistic” perspective. The luck 
of consensus on the relationship between the welfare state and PRRWPs constitutes a clear gap 
in the literature and largely informed the research aim of this thesis.  
 
1.2.1.2 Generalized trust 
The concept of generalized trust merit that in general, person A can be trusted. The theory 
contains a cognitive and a moral component. Based on our surroundings, we gather information 
to aid in our decision if we can trust person A. But we also rely on a normative morality in our 
judgement of another individual’s trustworthiness. (Rothstein, 2005: 58, 65) We can divide 
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generalized trust into two categories, social and political. While political distrust has been a 
reoccurring topic3 in PRRWP research. For social trust, there are only two avenues where it has 
been pursued. The first is in connection to Swank and Betz where it accounted to a plausible 
outcome of universal welfare. The second is in two papers which analyse the impact of social 
capital. The two concepts are not the same, however, like many have pointed out, though 
through different explanations, they are closely connected. (Rothstein, 2011: 168, Rothstein & 
Stolle, 2008: 441, Nannestad et al. 2014: 544, 545) The concept of social capital conceptualizes 
the idea that social interaction and social networks increases the populations wealth through the 
solution of common action problems and by assuring that agreements are upheld by both parts. 
The prospect corresponds highly with the ideology of the PRRWP as in that their ideology is 
based on the lack of trust towards out-groups(non-natives) in society. As such it may be be-
lieved that it could potentially be a common variable in PRRWP analysis. Yet the pickings of 
papers which refer to this concept is slim at best. Coffé, Hayndels & Vermeir (2007) found that 
social capital decreased the support for PRRWP’s. However, Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler 
(2009) found support for a link between PRRWP support and the level of social capital, where 
it gained significance as a moderator, but not by individual direct effect. It significantly reduced 
the impact of immigration and unemployment on PRRWP support in 8 European countries on 
the regional level. There Is a modelling difference in these papers that could help explain the 
variation in the results however. Jesuit et al. model their social capital variable on the previous 
work of Uslaner, which have hypothesized that one of the effects of high trust is support for 
income redistribution and thus reduced income inequality. (Uslaner, 2008: 22, Jesuit, Para-
dowski & Mahler, 2009: 281) Therefore, Jesuit et al. assumes that if we measure income ine-
quality, we also gain the significance of social capital on PRRWP support. Coffé et al. (2007) 
show that the level of income inequality show less impact on PRRWP support than that of social 
capital, which, in this paper, is measured by the number of socio-cultural organizations per 
capita. (Coffé et al. 2007: 145, 150) It should be mentioned that Jesuit et al. acknowledges the 
issue and explains their modelling as the effect of limited material in their data. Of the two, 
Coffé et al. can be considered to most accurately capture the concept of social capital relative 
to the underlying theories. The size of once social capital, or a person’s number of, and compo-
sition of, social connections also correlate to generation of generalized social trust. Bram 
Vanhoutte & Marc Hooghe find a correlation between small social networks and the likelihood 
to vote for a PRRWP. (Vanhoutte & Hooghe, 2013) On the other hand, Jens Rydgren & Patrick 
Ruth (2013) find evidence that socialization may potentially reduce the support of PRRWP’s 
in neighbourhoods where a significant minority of the population belong to the out-group. 
Moreover, they find that unemployed living in homogenous, or close to homogenous areas 
neighbouring areas with high levels of immigrants are more likely to vote for a PRRWP. 
 
The fact is that the literature on generalized trust is minimal. This leaves a gigantic gap which 
feeds further into my theoretical assumption that trust, or mechanisms to generate trust, could 
aid the research on the success of the PRRWP. In a paper in the journal political Psychology, 
Sam McFarland analysed right wing authoritarianism from a point of generalized prejudice. 
Among other things, he found that empathy and principled moral reasoning were directly neg-
atively correlated to prejudice. Additionally, he found that empathy in particular was strongly 
                                                          
3 See external supply side variables. 
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correlated with fair treatments of newly formed minority groups while authoritarians were sig-
nificantly more likely to take a nativist position. (McFarland, 2010) What I aim to say with this 
is that normative moral values are strongly connected to generalized trust. Trust in turn is con-
nected to impartial institutions that generate positive moral values. The lack of attention to 
generalized trust in PRRWP research form another big gap in the literature that further supports 
the aim of this study. 
 
1.2.1.3 Immigration 
Immigration is probably one of the most commonly included variables in the PRRWP research. 
It has been included in survey data studies, regional studies, cross-country studies and as a 
moderating factor for other variables. The results are varied but most commonly, the result 
show that immigration seldom lead to higher support for the PRRWP. (Arzheimer & Carter, 
2006; Kitschelt, 1995; Kestilä‐Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007) But others found a significant, 
positive effect on PRRWP support. (Golder, 2003. A; Swank & Betz, 2003). Knigge (1998) 
found a positive correlation with PRRWP support, however he concludes that while his study 
reflects the results on the macro level, the impact may look different on the micro-level. (ibid: 
268) Lubbers & Scheepers (2002) made a study on the individual and contextual level in France. 
Their findings on the topic were twofold. First, they found that people’s individual views on 
ethnic minorities did not correlated clearly to PRRWP support. However, secondly, they found 
that on the contextual level. Manual workers were more likely to vote for the PRRWP in em-
ployment sectors where the number of active immigrants where higher. They accredited this to 
the impact of economic threats and competition by doing an interaction where unemployment 
is included to account for sector based pressure. As such they found that in sectors where un-
employment and the number of immigrants were higher, manual workers were more likely to 
support a PRRWP. (ibid: 135, 139) The opposite results have been found by Oesch (2008), 
while he too finds support for that manual workers are a larger share of the PRRWP vote, his 
findings suggest that cultural factors, people’s perceptions, matters more than economic griev-
ances. In particular, this points to an inherent fear in the PRRWP voter that the substantiate a 
threat to the national identity and culture. However, others have found that anti-immigration 
sentiment among PRRWP voters are bigger in groups that perceive an economic threat from 
immigration. Thus in a particular vulnerable groups in society such as the elderly, the young 
and the unemployed. (Arzheimer, 2008) Rydgren & Ruth (2013) made a study on the level of 
election circles in Sweden. Their findings give support to the socio-economic explanation, and 
the halo effect. The halo effect theorizes that some areas tend to gather more immigrants than 
others, thus creating areas with high immigrant density as many non-immigrants move away. 
Thus leaving the native population living in a circle around the area, manifesting halo. The 
findings can be divided into two, within the area and in the relative halo area. They found that 
PRRWP support were negatively correlated to immigrant density. Secondly, they found that 
areas bordering high density areas with high unemployment and a low number of immigrants 
were positively correlated with PRRWP support. The perception of the economic threat feeds 
into the theoretical argument that supports the link between welfare and PRRWP support. If 
there is a reliance on welfare for security, changes in the level of welfare finding could cause 
an increased perception of threat to those which regularly rely on it in everyday life.  
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As an issue, immigration have been seen to increase PRRWP support if it gains attention, sali-
ence, in the political and medial debate. (Arzheimer, 2009; Dahlström & Sundell, 2012; Dahl-
ström & Esaiasson, 2011; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Rydgren, 2007) Others have 
downplayed the role of the medial discourse and instead argue that it’s the politicians that create 
issue salience and thereby open up for the PRRWP. (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008) A 
final position suggest that the relationship between media and politics is. Muis & Scholte (2013) 
suggest that the medial discourse works in convergence with the political positions of the parties 
to creates issue salience. Their findings suggest that when the media focused on socio-economic 
issues, socio-economic party positions mattered more and when media focused on socio-cul-
tural issues, socio-cultural party positions gained salience. (ibid: 41) As an interaction term, 
immigration have most often been combined with unemployment. The link between the two 
have been mentioned above, however the results of the interaction between unemployment and 
immigration have seen varying results. Arzheimer (2009) argues that the two does not support 
each other and that the interaction reaches a ceiling-point at which the interaction loses signif-
icance for the PRRWP vote. Golder (2003. A) found that the term did increase PRRWP support 
and Knigge (1998) argued that the interaction is insignificant. Dinas & Van Spanje (2011) in-
cluded an alternative interaction where they look for a link in voter preference for the PRRWP 
in the Netherlands, List Pim Fortuyn in relation to immigration and crime. Their findings show 
that when voters where tough on crime, they were more likely to vote PRRWP IF the two 
categories had been linked together by media or by political actors. (Ibid: 669. 670) Their find-
ings gain support by Sheets, Bos & Boomgaarden (2015) that found similar relationships in an 
experiment where they used cues to affect a reader’s opinion in a newspaper. They found that 
when an anti-immigration cue was combined with a PRRWP cue, the average score of anti-
immigrant sentiment increased. The relationship has been observed outside of the Netherlands 
as well. Coffé at al. (2007) found a positive relationship between areas with high crime and 
high levels of immigrants and positive PRRWP support in Belgium. A similar bottom line cor-
relation is found by Golder (2003. A.) That found that the interaction of election district*immi-
gration were positively correlated with PRRWP support, but only when the district magnitude 
reached a certain size. While the use of immigration as an interaction term have granted many 
new findings in the field over the last decade it will not be included in this paper. As the current 
theoretical argument feeds on the presence of immigrants, there is no reason to control for an 
interaction at this stage. The literature on issue salience carries over to supply side variables 
and the idea of issue salience as a whole for PRRWP success. The perception the link between 
welfare and immigration can be made if we perceive that immigration and welfare quality is 
linked by PRRWPs. As the concept of ethno-centric welfare policies have already been brought 
up, we can conclude that this most likely is the case. Additionally, the argument will be included 
as a control variable for the issue salience of immigration in the political sphere.  
 
Another area that have been discussed in regards to immigration is the origin of the “immi-
grant”. Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall (2012) analysed Sweden on a municipal level and found 
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that immigration from outside the Nordic countries increased support for the PRRWP. Arz-
heimer & Carter (2009) have made the argument that immigration as an issue can only attract 
voters that are non-immigrants. (ibid: 336) However results by others suggest that this is not 
the case. (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007) We can find documented examples of this from 
both France. (Formisano, 2005) and Sweden (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014) The implication 
becomes a near idealistic view on people that suggest that immigrants themselves would never 
be against other immigrants. Yet we may theorise, for example, that immigrants to perceive the 
economic threat that further tension to welfare systems. Rydgren & Ruth have shown in two 
studies that immigrant composition affects the PRRWP vote. In their analysis, they separated 
between immigrants from within the EU/EFTA and others. Their findings suggest that areas 
where the majority of immigrants were from the EU/EFTA group, PRRWP gained more votes, 
but areas with high concentration of immigrants from outside the EU/EFTA were negatively 
correlated with PRRWP support which equals less votes. (Rydgren & Ruth, 2011; Rydgren & 
Ruth, 2013) Coffé et al. (2007) found that immigrants of Turkish and Maghreb decent increased 
PRRWP support in Belgium while immigrants of other ethnicities had no significant effect. 
Bowyer (2008) found that in the United Kingdoms, he presence of large Pakistani and Bangla-
deshi populations in a neighbourhood positively affected the support of the British National 
Party(BNP) But this form of result has been questioned, both for its accuracy and for its use-
fulness. Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw (2011) analysed previous data from Flanders-Belgium 
in the time period 1987-2007. In their paper. they criticise the current practises of the PRRWP 
research. They found that various groups of immigrants had been more significant based on the 
contextual situation of the time. They found that the findings of Coffé et al. (2007) were accu-
rate up until 1991, after this point, the significance of the variable dropped off. Later, in the 
elections of 1999 and 2003, immigrants from Europe where more strongly correlated with 
PRRWP support. The authors theorize that this is a lagged effect of the fall of the iron curtain 
and the war in the Balkans. (ibid: 681) Their conclusion is that no specific group of immigrants 
is particularly different from another. What increases support for the PRRWP is more likely 
connected to the way in which a wave of refugees and asylum seekers are depicted in the medial 
and political discourse. (ibid: 685) The literature of the immigrants’ origin is a factor which could 
influence the results. This factor will therefore be included as a control variable in the analysis. 
 
1.2.1.4 Other factors 
Within the sociodemographic field we can see that age, gender, education, religion and employ-
ment have all been continuously included. Among the results, it has become an accepted fact 
that the once most common to support the PRRWP are men below the age of 25. More incon-
clusively is the support among the elderly. While Arzheimer & Carter (2006) argues that elderly 
is positively correlated with PRRWP support. Both claims correlate with the results from a 
recent opinion poll in Sweden. (Sannerstedt, 2014) Meanwhile, Dülmer & Klein (2005) found 
that people age 65 and up where negatively correlated with support for the German PRRWP 
“Republikaner”.   
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The impact of religion can be divided to two sides. One show that being active in a church is 
negatively correlated to PRRWP support. Something that can, in part, be explained by the en-
compassing values preached in the religious community. (Dülmer & Klein, 2005; Haugen, 
2015) Lubbers & Scheepers (2002) found that a subgroup, marginal Christians, were more 
likely to vote for a PRRWP in France, while the non-religious were significantly less likely to 
do so. As such, we may potentially conclude that there is a dilemma where those who perceive 
the threat of other religions are those who does not visit, or actively partake in religious insti-
tutions on a regular basis. As such they lose out on the trust-generating function that have been 
attributed to religious groups and instead hold a particularized view on Christian values. As 
such, an important factor in variable construction for future studies is to separate those who 
actively visits church and those that believe but do so on the margin. Secondly, Muslim popu-
lation have been studied with various results. Some have argued that it has no effect. (Lacassen 
& Lubbers, 2012) While others have found that anti-Muslim sentiment have a strong correlation 
to PRRWP support. (Muller et al. 2014) In connection to this finding, others have also found 
that Muslims vote significantly less for the PRRWP. (Vanhoutte & Hooghe, 2013) 
  
The impact of education is commonly considered to be significant, with increased educational 
attainment reducing PRRWP support. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Dülmer & Klein, 2005) This 
have been attributed both to increased knowledge, understanding and a higher development of 
critical thinking. Tying this together with the results of age, Schmuk & Matthes (2014) found 
that young people with less education where more susceptible to advertisement with pro-
PRRWP messages.  
 
The impact of unemployment has been analysed in at least three separate ways. The level of 
unemployment (Golder, 2003. A), being unemployed (Knigge, 1998) and the change in unem-
ployment over time (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Dülmer & Klein, 2005). The results are incon-
clusive. Some argues that the unemployment levels are negatively correlated to PRRWP sup-
port. (Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall, 2012) The effect is perhaps contradictory to the image of 
the angry protest voter. However, studies suggest that the unemployed are more likely to vote 
for a socio democratic party that focus more on creating jobs and worker rights. ((Jesuit, Para-
dowski & Mahler, 2009: 288) Some authors have found a positive correlation between unem-
ployment and PRRWP support. (Arzheimer, 2009, Kestilä‐Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007) Oth-
ers argue that there is a link, but the effect is only significant if the level of immigration is high. 
(Golder, 2003. A.) Yet others have found that unemployment is insignificant. (Lubbers & 
Scheepers, 2001) An alternative to the interaction between immigration and unemployment is 
suggested by Rydgren & Ruth (2013) that found unemployment to be a relative variable, where 
unemployment was positively correlated to PRRWP support if the unemployed lived in an area 
bordering an area with a high population of immigrants.  
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Crime has been given little attention in PRRWP research, but still enough to show a varied 
outcome. Often, it’s been suggested to be a relative factor dependent on others such as immi-
gration or people’s perceptions of the quality of law and order institutions. Or when it is linked 
with immigration through a discursive process, either by media or by politicians. (Dinas & Van 
Spanje, 2011) Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw (2011) further finds that crime had a temporal 
effect on PRRWP support and suggest that it could be correlated with such contextual factors 
as trust in the police and the capability of the state to maintain law and order. (ibid: 674) Further, 
this may be aided by the findings of Rydgren & Ruth ((2011) that discovered a strong, positive, 
correlation between the number of reported crimes and PRRWP support. The positive effect on 
PRRWP support have also been suggested by Lewis-Beck & Mitchell (1998) However, yet 
again, evidence is inconclusive and other authors found no significant link between PRWWP 
support and crime rates. (Bowyer, 2008: 647; (Coffé, Hayndels & Vermeir, 2007) 
 
Wealth have had two significantly different functions in the PRRWP research. One have been 
connected to welfare chauvinism, the theory that suggests that the rise of the PRRWP is not 
only due to a disgruntled lower class but to a worried (upper)middle class that sees how the 
welfare system they built up is drained by immigrants and thus make them and their families 
lose out on what they have worked for. (Kitschelt, 1995) In its operationalisation, this have been 
studied in factors of average income to show how PRRWP support have been correlated with 
higher income areas. (Coffé et al., 2007: 153; Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011) Other 
studies have found a different relationship when the average income level was higher in a neigh-
bourhood if a bordering area had a higher concentration of immigrant inhabitants. (Rydgren & 
Ruth, 2013) The impact of relative income have also been shown to have an effect on the cross-
national level. PRRWP support have been shown to relate to anti-EU sentiment. A study by 
Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie (2005) found that a country with average less GDP growth 
than their neighbouring EU countries were more likely to have higher PRRWP support rates. 
This can also be connected to the field of generalized trust where Erik Uslaner have argued that 
while the individual income level matters little for trust, the economy of the country does. If 
the economy of the country falls, economic inequality increases and trust decreases. As such, 
your trust is not dependent on you alone, but on the world around you. (Uslaner, 2008: 22) To 
support this argument, it should be noted that when inflation have been included in PRRPW 
analysis, it has been found to be insignificant. This effect puts further emphasis on that the 
national economic development matters less than that of how good the country is doing relative 
to others. (Knigge, 1998; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005) The benefit of this literature 
is three fold. First, it informs us of the link between age and PRRWP support. It may therefore 
be wise to include the number of people directly correlated with the relevant welfare institutions 
in the model. It further informs us of the impact of education to an individual’s prospects of 
voting for the PRRWP. As such, there is merit to first and foremost focus on lower level insti-
tutions when analysing education. Secondly, the effect of religion helps to inform the argument 
of generalized trust. There is merit in believing that organizations that are all-encompassing, 
either cultural or religious, could aid in the generation of generalized, opposite to partial, trust.  
Thirdly, the remaining topics is intended to both inform the reader of other areas of PRRWP 
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research and to similarly inform the construction of the model with the intent to run the model 
with all alternative demand side variables as control variables. 
 
1.2.2 External supply-side research 
The research on external supply-side variables can be divided into three areas. Political trust, 
political party positions and electoral system composition. Political trust may also be connected 
to political dissatisfaction. While the PRRWP have been positioned ideological position as anti-
establishment (Rydgren, 2005), studies have attempted to find out if their voters reflect this 
position. The concept of political trust can take three forms. Trust in the government, trust in 
political parties or trust in all or individual public institutions. Oskarson & Demker (2015) 
found that low trust in the established political parties among the working class, combined with 
the PRRWPs positioning on authoritarian policy positions, together explain the increased sup-
port of the PRRWP, by the working class, in Sweden. Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund (2009.A) 
found that supporters of the PRRWP in Norway on average were less trusting of the mainstream 
political parties, the political institutions and of others in general. Additionally, they found that 
the level of mistrust increased dependent on how strongly they related to the party. (ibid: 174, 
175) Other examples of papers which have included political dissatisfaction, have studied dis-
satisfaction with political parties (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002), the process of democracy (Lub-
bers, Gusberts & Scheepers, 2002) and in political institutions and the political regime (Knigge, 
1998) also found support for the PRRWP. Swyngedouw (2001) found that political dissatisfac-
tion due to weaker ideological differences between the mainstream parties and/or political scan-
dals turned into political dissatisfaction pushed voters towards the PRRWP vote. 
 
The weakened distinction between the left and the right is an issue that carries us over to the 
research on party positions. It has been found when party positions converge, they open up for 
PRRWPs to declare themselves as the sole opposite party. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Loxbo, 
2015) This have put into question the aforementioned practise of adversarial positions in rela-
tion to PRRWP parties. It has been shown that while everyone takes an adversarial stance, most 
commonly by cross-ideological cooperation, it keeps the PRRWP out of politics. However once 
the coalition breaks by one or more parties. The breakoff often leads to accommodative attitudes 
from the break of parties to PRRWP issues which in turn increases the legitimacy of the 
PRRWP. (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011) Cross-national adversarial positions, such as were 
used towards Austria when the Austrian Freedom Party(FPÖ) came into power in the year 
2000. When foreign powers impeded sanctions on Austria the support for the PRRWP govern-
ment increased to where only 15% of the population wanted them out of government. (Fallend 
& Heinisch, 2016) Dahlström & Sundell (2012) made a study of all Swedish municipalities 
where they compared local mainstream politicians position on immigration with the popularity 
of the Sweden Democrats and found that there where a positive effect on PRRWP support when 
local politicians had a tougher stance. They further found that when separated to left and right, 
the impact of immigration toughness had a greater impact when the left changed their positions 
then the impact of the right-wing position. This could be correlated with the findings of other 
researchers that connect the ideological position of the working class to that of the PRRWP. 
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(Oskarson & Demker, 2015) The legitimizing power of the mainstream issue accommodation 
and the ideological position of the working class should sufficiently cause a move of the left-
wing to be tougher on immigration to also affect the support for the PRRWP. It is important to 
consider that any such move does not only mean the legitimization of the PRRWP. It can also 
include an increased dissatisfaction and de-legitimizing effect on the mainstream parties that 
seem to turn the coat for the wind as they try to accommodate popular issues to take back voters 
from the PRRWP, causing an opposite effect. 
 
The link between political systems and PRRWP support have been studied from a few angels. 
It has been shown that the election district magnitude may affect the vote outcome of PRRWP’s 
which may strategically target such areas. However, the results are inconclusive as both statis-
tically significant (positive) (Golder, 2003. A) and insignificant associations (Kestilä‐Kekkonen 
& Söderlund, 2007) were found. Although earlier research attributed the electoral susses of the 
PRRWP parties with the electoral system (Jackman and Volpert, 1996), the soundness of this 
finding has later been questioned. (Golder 2003. B; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Van der Brug, 
Fennema & Tillie, 2005) Another inconclusive factor is election thresholds. Earlier studies 
found that higher thresholds meant less PRRWP votes as voters perceived that their vote might 
be vested if the PRRWP didn’t get in. (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998: 262) But a 
recent study found no such correlation. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006: 432) Hypothetically, this 
could be due to that PRRWPs in parliament are becoming increasingly common through Eu-
rope. Thus granting increased legitimacy to the party family. 
 
The final category of external-supply side variables historical context. The reason that this var-
iable is considered a supply and not demand side variable is that it considers the previous sup-
port for authoritarian as a source of possible support, but not necessarily due to a demand for, 
the radical right. Studies have analysed the impact of history through the concept of path de-
pendency. That previous neo-fascist, extreme-right wing or PRRWP parties may have consti-
tuted a base of supporters. (Bowyer, 2008: 618; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005: 566) 
However studied through a Large-N analysis, this factor seems to be insignificant in the case 
of PRRWP support in Sweden. (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012) An alternative form of historical 
heritage is when a PRRWP grows out of an extreme right party directly. Even though the party 
have evolved, these parties commonly get their legitimacy as a democratic party questioned. 
Some authors have expressed that such a heritage may negatively affect their potential vote 
share. (Cutts, Ford & Goodwin, 2011; Widfeldt, 2008; Loxbo, 2015; 178) 
 
1.2.3 Internal supply-side variables 
In the search to understand PRRWP support, the PRRWP themselves have often been forgotten 
in favour of demand side variables. (Mudde, 2010; Muis & Scholte, 2013) The finings can be 
divided between three areas: party strategy, party presence and the importance of a political 
leader. This does not mean that they are not interlinked, like indeed, a majority of this literature 
review show. For example, Widfeldt (2008) argue that the political strategy of the PRRWP in 
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Sweden was to establish a network of local faculties to connect with local areas. (ibid: 273) 
Meanwhile, Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall (2012) show that local representation is positively 
correlated with PRRWP success in these areas. The important difference is that the actual pres-
ence does not always reflect a strategy. The same study found no conclusive evidence that 
PRRWP’s targeted areas where they may gain more votes due to demand-side circumstances. 
(ibid: 832) The strategical decision to increase their local presence can be explained by two 
factors. Evidence suggest that people are more likely to perceive a small party as unserious and 
thus not a valid option. A party that presents itself on the local level may instead seem large 
and thus offer valid alternatives to other major parties. (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2009) The 
second reason is to normalize the party’s values. A party with an active local presence can 
interact as a respectable face for the party. Thus attract voters who might not only be looking 
for a national but a sensible local representative, even if the main party’s values seems radical. 
Loxbo (2015) argues that this may be the reason for the increased support of the Sweden Dem-
ocrats They both increased their local presence and vote share between the 2006 and 2010 elec-
tions. In particular, he argues that this move switched their electorate from mainly working 
class to also include a health amount of middle, and upper, class voters. This have in turn been 
suggested to be a necessary step to become a legitimate political actor. (Art, 2011)  
 
The political strategy has been connected to the acclimatisation to an advantageous situation. 
Often connected to issue ownership. Many studies have shown how PRRWPs gain support if 
they can claim ownership of a specific issue such as immigration, corruption or security. (Hell-
ström, Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012; Mudde, 2010: 1080; Muis & Scholte, 2013: 41 Oskarson & 
Demker (2015) argues that ownership of the entire authoritarian sector of the liberal/authoritar-
ian scale allows the PPRWP’s to gain followers from the group, particularly working class, that 
holds authoritarian values additional to the classic left/right cleavage. Thus “owning” the au-
thoritarian issue is another form of issue ownership beyond a single issue. These findings are 
also supported by Spies (2013) 
 
As a political actor, the political leaders have often been attributed an extraordinary influence 
on the PRRWP vote. Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund (2014) found that for PRRWPs, the 
character of the party leader had an abnormal influence of the party’s popularity relative too 
other political parties. (ibid: 657) This effect was also present when compared to other local 
leaders of the same political party. Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers (2002) found that in com-
bination with well-organized members and a strong, active party core had enough influence in 
their model to offset the influence of both education and anti-immigrant sentiment in most of 
their cases. Additionally, party leaders have been argued to fill a role when creating issue sali-
ence for PRRWP-beneficial topics. (Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011) But not all authors agree, 
some have attempted to downplayed the effect. (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008) Van der 
Brug & Mughan (2007) even make the argument that the PRRWP leader is no different in sig-
nificance to any other political party leader. (ibid: 45). 
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1.2.4 Research question 
The literature of the electoral success of PRRWPs examined a plethora of factors on both the 
supply and demand side. Specifically, the literature points to the importance of political or gen-
eral trust for the outcome in question and the role of the welfare state. But it fell short in linking 
changes in the welfare state with changes in generalized and political trust and then the 
PRRWPs electoral success. Therefore, the research question that this thesis engages with is 
what the impact of the welfare state is on the electoral support of the PRRWP? In particular, I 
aim to investigate whether the difference in the amount of welfare provisions (partial welfare) 
is linked with the varying degrees of electoral support received by PRRWPs? 
 
By asking this question, I aim to add to the research on the relationship between PRRWP and 
public welfare. In particular, I aim to add the idea of partiality in public institutions to the 
field. A topic which I have been unable to find any previous research about. The outcome of 
the paper could potentially offer a wider understanding as to what effects the shifting role of 
the state have had on the rise of the PRRWP. A topic which today is primarily dominated by a 
population diversity paradigm where immigration is the main focus, yet few ask themselves 
why the immigration issue have been given so much room in the debate. I believe that uneven 
distribution may offer an explanation to this particular issue. 
 
2 Theory 
In this section I am going to show how variance in the welfare provision may affect the amount 
of support people offer to PRRWPs.  
 
2.1 Partial welfare 
The welfare state has many forms. Swank & Betz refer to 3 variations. Universal, conservative 
and liberal. The universalistic welfare system, categorized by comprehensive coverage of citi-
zens, within risk categories, a generous social wage and well developed active labour market 
programs differs to a corporatist, conservative (and liberal) welfare system which is categorized 
either by generous, occupationally based, social coverage and insurance while having minimal 
social service provisions. Alternatively, they can be recognized by a disproportional reliance 
on means-tested or private insurance and moderate to low levels of income replacements. 
(Swank & Betz, 2003: 224) From a theoretical perspective, the latter two are inherently partial. 
By partial I mean a welfare system that caters to, or treats certain groups, different from others 
within the same system. My argument is that while it is common to compare partial or universal 
institutions on the national level, sub national level variation is often forgotten or ignored. This 
is problematic as we can see significant variation in how good welfare services functions within, 
as well as between, countries. There is considerable local autonomy in many countries on the 
level of funding the welfare institutions receive. For example, both in Sweden and in the UK, 
the budget for education, elderly care and part of the healthcare institutions rely on municipal 
funding. Yet there are no national guidelines to decide the exact sum for welfare expenditures 
and there are room for local variation, sometimes due to arbitrary reasons such as local budget 
prioritization. In a paper from the UK, three prestige projects, which aimed to increase the no-
tability of the municipality and further local development, were evaluated. Among the findings, 
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the paper showed that in two out of the three projects. Funding were cut from the local welfare 
budget to make room for the additional expenses of the projects. (Loftman & Nevin, 1996) The 
economic argument runs even deeper in the welfare sector. Especially in the Nordic countries, 
the state had a significant role as welfare provider. But with the rise of capitalism in the 1990’s. 
The view on welfare services became more and more economized. The continuous focus on 
economic efficiency have negatively affected the quality of welfare services in general.  (Ros-
skam, 2006; Lynch, 2006; Beach, 2009) In particular, the vulnerability to this change in quality 
differs between the upper and lower social class. Members of the upper class have, even before 
the change in the 90’s, been capable of ensuring their own quality of health and education ser-
vices through private enterprises, or means based assurance. The true dependents on welfare is, 
and have always been, the lower classes. Those which lack the financial means to assure their 
own social and economic security. These are also considered to be the once to suffer the brunt 
of the change in welfare quality. (Beach, 2009) An anthological study at an elementary school 
in the UK offer some support to the argument. Diane Reay (2012) wrote about the issues of 
education in Great Britain from a class perspective. She shows that funding is one of the ele-
ments that will create variation in the quality of the education, together with other factors such 
as school choice and reputation. In particular, she describes how the students expressed that 
they perceived it unfair that their school seems underfunded and run-down relative to other 
schools with more resources (Reay, 2012: 45-47). The role of the universal welfare state was 
to assure equal access to the fulfilment of once capacity without discrimination against individ-
ual citizens on the basis of their individual circumstances. This would synthesize with the gen-
eration of positive normative values that would increase both political and generalized trust in 
the population. (Rothstein, 1998: 52-55) On the basis of the previous examples as well as the 
theoretical assumption by Rothstein, I conclude that partial welfare has two forms.  
 
1) A welfare system that intentionally caters to one specific part of the population. 
 
2) A welfare system where an individual is limited in the fulfilment of his/her full capacity. 
 
Of the two functions of partial welfare, a means based systems such as the conservative or 
liberal welfare system described by Swank & Betz (2003) heavily dependent on private insur-
ances with weak social services represents the first form of partial welfare. On the other hand, 
the example from the UK would fit in under the second form. While the system does not inten-
tionally favour specific groups, the children that were interviewed perceived themselves to be 
treated unfairly perceived their school to be underfunded relative to others. This in turn rein-
forced their scepticism to authorities and in turn, less trusting in other groups of society. Of the 
two functions, I believe the second to be particularly prevalent in the Nordic countries where 
the universal welfare state has a long and strong tradition. 
 
 
2.2 Variance in welfare provisions and the PRRWP 
While there are no specific findings that support the link between funding and quality, the ar-
gument that the economization of welfare institutions that focused on economic efficiency, 
school choice and privatization have negatively affected institutional quality. (Bleach, 2009) I 
believe that the argument can be taken further however. As I concluded in the overview on 
economic factors of PRRWP, relative wealth mattered more in understanding PRRWP than 
absolute wealth. I believe that this function carries over in a similar pattern to welfare provi-
sions. To hear how much a municipality spends on education in absolute terms say little about 
how they prioritize it. However, if it is presented in relative terms, then there is something to 
compare with. This is why I believe that relative welfare funding is a better measurement then 
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absolute welfare funding, but it also relates to the previous argument made on partial welfare. 
If a municipality spends less than the average on education, then it could be perceived as ne-
glecting the welfare function relative to other municipalities in general, and relative to other 
municipal projects in particular. The argument is further informed by the literature on issue 
salience. Looking at the medial discourse, it is not uncommon to find articles which points out 
the difference in welfare expenditures, or in this case, education funding, between the top and 
bottom municipalities (Tideman, September 24th, 2014) or relative to the national average 
(Fjellman, September 20th, 2016) Both brings the issue to the public’s attention. In turn, we can 
expect this to affect the way in which they perceive the current municipal welfare provision to 
be unfair, or fair, depending on where in the scale from top to bottom, above or below average, 
that they rank. In line with the findings of Muis & Scholte (2013), we can expect that this in 
turn creates a heightened attention to issue specific policies from the political parties and thus 
granting higher salience to welfare as an issue. As the PRRWP have taken positions to improve 
welfare, make it ethnocentrically, this could aid in increasing their support. Additionally, if the 
PRRWP argues that the variation is in part due to immigration, the party could draw additional 
support from the distrust to government caused by the partial welfare provision. Further, I be-
lieve that this argument draws strength the link between right wing authoritarianism and ethnic 
intolerance (McFarland, 2010) and ethnic intolerance and increased care for the elderly relative 
to immigrants. (Van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007: 79, 80) 
 
2.3 Mechanisms of partial welfare 
I argue that the association between variance in the welfare provision and electoral support for 
PRRWPs runs through two mechanisms.  
 
a) Insecurity generated by partial welfare provision may leads to lower trust in the state 
and in its institutions which may be beneficial to PRRWPs which are populist at their 
core. The reduced political trust would then feed into the group of voters that support 
the PRRWP due to their mistrust in the democratic system in general, and the current 
mainstream political parties in particular.  
 
b) Insecurity generated by partial welfare provision may lead to lower generalized trust 
through the lack of reinforced positive norms by the perception of partiality in the sys-
tem which in turn is reinforcing negative trust in authority, i.e. the establishment. 
Thereby both creating a perception of relative deprivation that enforces the idea that one 
social group gains, or takes, more than they deserve which may then be exploited by the 
PRRWP by pushing for ethnocentric welfare. This mechanism feeds both into the wel-
fare chauvinist argument and the “losers of modernity” argument,  
 
Together, both mechanisms account for the main characteristics of the PRRWP, mechanism a) 
supports the anti-establishment agenda. Mechanism b) captures both their authoritarian position 
and their centre right position which contains both support for welfare and the right wing ideo-
logical position of entitlement to services you help pay for. By this last argument, I point to the 
welfare chauvinist argument and the perception that you and your family are entitled to what 
you pay taxes for, relative to others which might not add as much to the pool of resources that 
are redistributed through the welfare function. Further, function b) also feeds into the perception 
of an economic threat. If there is a link between immigration and reduced welfare quality, then 
a plausible train of though is that further immigration could further reduce welfare quality. Thus 
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offering a plausible connection between lower class voters and welfare provisions. As I de-
scribed above, this is the group which perceive the unevenness of the welfare system the most, 
while upper class voters have enough individual capital to circumvent the issue. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis 
In light of the discussion above, I formulate the following hypotheses. 
 
H: If welfare provisions for welfare institution X is below average, the vote share of the PRRWP 
increases. 
 
In order to account for national context. The hypothesis will be further deconstructed to testable 
hypotheses based on a selection of welfare intuitions which correlate to the municipal level of 
the Sweden. 
 
3 Methodology 
This chapter includes the definition of empirical setting and the level of study, data operationalization 
and method selection. 
3.1 Empirical setting 
I opted for the sub-national politic as the empirical setting to test the hypothesis. There are 
several reasons for this. The first reason is that the case of welfare expenditures is limited to a 
national setting. While we may compare average welfare expenditure levels between countries, 
we cannot compare the relative cost of welfare relative to a national average. Therefore, the 
way that the variables are operationalized determines the level of analysis. The second reason 
is that the use of subnational data enables a greater number of observations, which means that 
we can account for more variation than in cross-national studies. Additionally, it allows us to 
keep the broader political system and institutional variables constant. Thus enabling higher fo-
cus on comparing relevant demand and supply side variables without taking differences of na-
tional differences into account (Kestilä‐Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2007: 363). The choice of sub-
national politics adds this paper to the growing line of work that looks at subnational variation. 
This is in part a reaction to the call by other authors to analyse data on the subnational level 
more as it previously mostly revolved around cross-national studies of West-European coun-
tries. Thus practically analysing the same data with slightly different combinations of variables 
each time (Mudde, 2007; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011; 
Arzheimer & Carter, 2009). The number of publications that uses such data has increased over 
the last few years.4 However the field is still highly dominated by cross-national analyses. 
                                                          
4 See for example Dahlström & Sundell, 2012; Loxbo, 2015; Dülmer & Klein, 2005; Bowyer, 2008 Kestilä‐Kek-
konen & Söderlund, 2007 
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3.1.1 Sweden 
I have selected to use Sweden as a case for this study. The reasoning behind this is threefold. 
Firstly, the standing of welfare institutions within the cultural context of Sweden is of para-
mount importance. The welfare state has been connected to the Swedish national identity since 
the 1920’s until today when it is often referred to as “the Swedish model”. This imply almost 
100 years of universal welfare connected to the core values of the Swedish identity. (Hellström, 
Nilsson & Stoltz, 2012: 194-197) While this does not mean that all Swedes value welfare 
equally but it suggests that most Swedes do, particularly those with ethno-nationalist values. 
Secondly, the decentralized nature of the political system in Sweden allow for a considerable 
subnational variation in terms of municipal finances. Swedish municipalities are responsible 
for allocating funds for basic public goods. This includes education and elderly care. However, 
this does not relate to healthcare which is divided between municipal and regional authorities. 
Furthermore, similarly to the United Kingdom, where budget prioritization has already been 
proved to exist (Loftman & Nevin, 1996), the Swedish municipalities have also been active in 
municipal brand making. (Brorström, 2010; Brorström & Parment. 2014) Thirdly, it reflects a 
choice of convenience where a large amount of easily accessible and accurate data exists. Cur-
rently, data coverage in all variables exist for all 290 municipalities. It is important to notice 
that while the results of the study may not be generalizable beyond the Swedish case before 
more research is done, it may suggest further alleyways for analysis which have previously 
been unexplored. 
 
3.1.2 Sweden Democrats 
Over the last two decades, Sweden has had two parties in the PRRWP family. Ny Demokrati 
(New Democracy) between 1991 and 2000. It held seats in parliament between 1991-1994 
(Rydgren, 2005) The second party, Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats(SD)) ). They 
have risen rapidly in popularity from 2.9 % in 2006 to 12.9% in 2014. (Loxbo, 2015; Erlingsson, 
Loxbo & Öhrvall, 2012) Currently, national poles place them at 17.3%. (PSU, 2016) Their 
support base correlates with the same basic characteristics of other PRRWPs. Males between 
18 and 25, individuals 65+ (Sannerstedt, 2014) with a strong connection to the working class. 
(Oskarson & Demker, 2015: 635) The party is considered to be centre/authoritarian on the 
left/right/liberal/authoritarian scale (Loxbo, 2015: 180) and are in the group of parties identified 
as sympathizers for an ethno-nationalistic welfare system. (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2015) The 
party fits well into the authoritarian position. When referring to their webpage and political 
program it offers itself as a party that represents “change for real”5. The party also present itself 
to represent all of Sweden6. (Sverigedemokraterna, n.d. A) Of particular interest for the strength 
of issue salience is the section on immigration in the party program. Here, SD expresses the 
need to limit immigration so that the level and character of immigration won’t be a threat to the 
national identity, the national welfare or security7. (SD, n.d. B). All points to that SD fulfil all 
characteristics of the PRRWP identified previously. It is centre-right win authoritarian with an 
                                                          
5 “förändring på riktigt” - All translations are done by the author. The webpage itself offers no alternative lan-
guage setting 
6 “hela Sveriges parti” 
7 “Sverigedemokraterna motsätter sig inte invandring, men menar att invandringen måste hållas på en sådan 
nivå och vara av en sådan karaktär att den inte utgör ett hot mot vår nationella identitet eller mot vårt lands väl-
färd och trygghet.” 
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emphasis in nativist policies and with a soft spot for the welfare state. In particular. The party 
connects the two issues of welfare quality to immigration which correspond to the theoretical 
argument made in the previous section. 
 
3.1.3 Adjusted Hypothesis 
To account for the empirical setting described above, I have constructed two adjusted hypoth-
eses. 
 
H1: If municipal expenditure on education is below average, the vote shares of the PRRWP 
increase. 
H2: If municipal expenditure in elderly care is below average, the vote shares of the PRRWP 
increase. 
 
3.2 Data 
This section will detail the selection and 
operationalisation of the dependent, in-
dependent and control variables and 
summarize them in a table with descrip-
tive statistics. 
 
In order to find an effective relationship 
between municipal expenditures on el-
derly care and education on the one 
hand and the support for the PRRWP, I 
opted to use change rather than levels 
approach to calculate my dependent 
variable. Consequently, to account for 
the support for the Sweden Democrats, 
I constructed a measure by calculating the change in the electoral support for the Sweden Dem-
ocrats between the 2010 and 2014 elections. The variable appears normally distributed and does 
not suffer from skew or kurtosis. It is thus not necessary to transform the data.    
 
3.2.1 Operationalization, Education expenditures(H1) 
The concept of education expenditure is measured with three variables. Three individual vari-
ables, education expenditure, external expenditures and children enrolled in education. The first 
variable is calculated as the sum of difference between the national average and local expendi-
tures over the period of 2010 to 2013. This is in order to account for yearly fluctuations. The 
reason that the scope is limited to 2013 is to account for lag and secondly to avoid any effects 
that may be caused by partisan politics from municipal governments that attempts to appease 
upset voters. The variable will be calculated in line with the following equation. X is the varia-
ble we want to construct, the difference between municipal and average national spending on 
Figure 1 Histogram, dependent variable SD_change 
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education. N is the national average, M is the municipal average and Y is the number of years 
which we are averaging. 
 
𝑋1 =
((𝑀1 − 𝑁1) + (𝑀2 − 𝑁2) + (𝑀3 − 𝑁3) + (𝑀4 − 𝑁4))
𝑌
 
 
As the years we calculate for span between 2010 and 2013, Y = 4, thus giving the width of the 
equation that ranges from 𝑁1 to 𝑁4. The variable will be based on education spending on the 
level of primary education, grade 1 through 9 for the average student. The logic behind this 
selection is two-fold. Firstly, above the level of primary education, the Swedish students are 
free to select a direction in their studies. This ranges from practical to theoretical subjects and 
on a variety of institutions, many with an acceptance area beyond the municipal range. The 
freedom of choice should level the impact of the average expenditures show less when we con-
trast different educational structures, subjects and individual interest. The effect also turns the 
institutional variation on its head and would no longer allow us to keep the institutional form 
somewhat similar. University level would not make sense either, as there is no link between 
university/college level finances and the municipality. Secondly, to choose the average student 
rather than all students or students with special needs is that we are interested in measuring the 
impact of budget prioritization on the many, not the few. The theoretical foundation for the 
argument state that the PRRWP gain support when general trust decreases. It decreases, in this 
case, due to that the children don’t have the same support in their education as students where 
the municipality spend more. It is therefore important to note that the data used does not average 
in costs for those with special needs, including immigrants which need extra resources to catch 
up to the same level as their peers and at the same time also learn the language. 
 
The second variable, school building expenditures relate to other costs which relate to education 
beyond those which directly affect the child. These are connected to internal and external costs 
to keep and maintain the internal and external areas of the school grounds and building. This 
variable has been included because there is an argument that have been made that some munic-
ipalities have had to choose between higher external costs due to local housing rents or a higher 
number of smaller schools in order to have better school coverage (Österman, October 21, 
2013). The variable will be calculated through the same equation as education expenditures. 
The third variable measures the average number of students enrolled in primary education 
within the municipality over the same period of 4 years.  
 
3.2.2 Operationalization, Elderly care(H2) 
To test H2, I used two variables to measure the concept of elderly care expenditures. Elderly 
care expenditures and people above the age of 65. The variables will be calculated by the same 
equation as in IV set 1. Elderly care is measured by the aggregated cost of all three sections of 
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the Swedish elderly care system. This include day care, care in special homes and care at home.8 
The data is calculated as the total cost over 1 year and divided by the number of inhabitants of 
age 65 and above on the 31st of December for each year. The reason behind this selection is that 
while data existed that divided the sum over all inhabitants, it would, in first hand, be those of 
age 65+ that are actually affected and connected to the expenses. Further, in correlation with 
the second variable, the percentage of inhabitants above age 65, it will offer an insight into the 
growing issue of de-population and rising elderly care costs in the rural parts of Sweden.  
 
When computing the variable elderly expenditures. It was found that no value existed for the 
year 2012 for Nykvarn municipality. To account for this missing value, the sum of the other 
observations between 2010 and 2014 were summed up and divided by 4 to calculate the mean. 
The missing value was then replaced by the municipal mean. This to fill in the missing value 
while not affecting the overall result of the municipality or the national average for that year. 
This is in line with the method used by Dahlström & Sundell to fill in missing values in the few 
cases where no responses were received. (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012: 357) The mean value 
was calculated to 33292.75 and rounded up to 33293. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Many authors have made the argument that when we construct a model to measure the way in 
which PRRWP gain support, a mix of both demand and supply variables should be included. 
(Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 482; Pauwels, 2010: 271; Mudde, 2010; 1181) As such, I 
will draw upon the variables which was cowered in the literature review to comprise a mixed 
set of variables from both sides.  
 
The basic set of variables which is included on the demand side is immigration, education, 
crime and unemployment. As the findings remain inconclusive, I will include these as well. 
Immigration will be operationalised as two variables in line with the findings of Rydgren & 
Ruth (2013) and so I will separate between immigrants from the EU/EFTA and immigrants 
from outside the EU. Unemployment will be measured by the percentage of unemployed in the 
municipality. (Golder, 2003. A) Education will be broken down into two variables measuring 
% of population with higher and lower education. This is a simplified version of Arzheimer & 
Carter (2006) which included larger variation. However, in line with the findings of Schmuk & 
Matthes (2014), I believe that the most important breaking point is between primary and sec-
ondary education. Income inequality will be included in order to contrast the findings of this 
paper with the previous research that have utilized it as a proxy-variable to measure social cap-
ital. To make sure that I contrast appropriately, I will use the gene-coefficient of income ine-
quality which is in line with the model used by Jesuit, Paradowski & Mahler (2009)  
                                                          
8 For an in depth walkthrough of the Swedish elderly care system and its functions, visit www.swedish-
healthcare.com 
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To further measure the effect of the economic factors, I will control for the relative wealth 
argument that I discussed in the literature review, inspired by Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 
(2005), on the municipal level as well as individual wealth. To control for the relative wealth, 
I will control for the change in municipal Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita relative to 
the national average. In order to account for the difference. I will utilize the same equation as 
for education and elderly care expenditures with the difference that we are limited to data from 
two years. The Swedish bureau of statistics only collected data for the years 2012 and 2013. 
While it would have been preferable to have data for all four years, the result will be similar. 
We will still be able to account for the average change relative to the national average, but with 
the limitation that we cannot account for random effects. In order to account for the welfare 
chauvinist hypothesis, a control will also be added for disposable income, measured by its mean 
value per inhabitant, age 20+. (Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw, 2011, Kitschelt, 1995) Crime 
will be measured by the number of crimes reported for every 100 000 citizens. This goes in line 
with previous modelling (Rydgren & Ruth, 2011), however the research overview show that 
the effect of crime might more likely be based on people’s perception of the quality of the crime 
fighting institutions. An alternative variable which were considered for this paper was to utilize 
satisfaction statistics that measured people’s perception of security in line with the suggestion 
by Poznyak, Abts & Swyngedouw (2011) This took into account the fear of various crimes 
being committed. The issue with this data were that it turned out to be incomplete and non-
consecutive. There several cases with missing values and no single year existed where all mu-
nicipalities had made the survey, as such I controlled for data between 2010 and 2014 and still 
found missing values. It may be possible to go back further however at that point the variable 
would no longer fill any function as it did no longer reflect the citizen’s views connected to any 
period close to the election.  Neither would it reflect possible changes applied by the law and 
order institutions in order to counteract growing insecurity. The variable was therefore dis-
carded and replaced by the current variable. To account for the local Swedish context, a variable 
was retrieved to measure the percentage of the municipal population that lives outside of the 
city centre. Together with men under the age of 25 and the elderly, people from the rural areas 
are considered to be more supportive of the Sweden Democrats. (Sannersted, 2014) 
 
In order to account for support side variables. This paper will utilize five variables. Issue sali-
ence, presence, party organization, historic precondition and election participation. In order to 
measure issue salience. I will include the data from Dahlström & Sundell (2012) which measure 
the mainstream party’s toughness on immigration9. The data comes with an adverse effect 
which must be taken into account. Unfortunately, the data was retrieved in 2008 and no similar 
data exists from a later date. As such, this should be kept in mind when interpreting the results 
as it affects the conclusions that we may draw from the outcome. To measure historic precon-
ditions, it makes little sense to measure extremist roots of the Sweden Democrats, as might be 
sensible in a cross-national study. The benefit of the sub-national level is that this variable is 
                                                          
9 For a full description, see Dahlström & Sundell, 2012: 356, 357 
30 
 
constant. Instead, I will again borrow from Dahlström & Sundell (2012) and include a meas-
urement for the vote share of New Democracy in 1994. This is the only other PRRWP that have 
had a set in the Swedish parliament between 1991 and 1994. (Dahlström & Sundell, 2012; 358) 
Opposite to Dahlström & Sundell however, I will not include the vote share of the nationalist 
party from 1936. The reasoning behind this decision is based on the position that the PRRWP 
differs from the fascist party family which had its high in the middle of the 20th century. Addi-
tionally, in depth studies of the neo-fascist movements in Sweden suggest that families con-
nected to this group of parties are less likely to end up with the Sweden Democrats and more 
likely to connect with the modern neo-fascist movements such as “Svenska motståndsrörelsen”. 
(Lööw, 2015) The variable has two missing values. In the regression, these are replaced by the 
value of the mean after the assurance of normal distribution.  
 
Erlingsson, Loxbo & Öhrvall (2012) found that local organizations of SD aided in facilitating 
their success. Unfortunately, there are no list of local SD organizations from 2014. The afore-
mentioned authors utilized formal ballots to account for SD presence. However, as the SD en-
tered the parliament the same year. The election centres are now obligated to assure the presence 
of SD ballots at all facilities. It would thus be unreliable to use the same approach now. How-
ever, their findings suggested that presence correlated with a higher number of chairs in the 
municipal council. Therefore, I will utilize this measurement as an approximation of party pres-
ence by including the number of chairs gained by SD in the 2010 elections. Thus accounting 
for possible lag. Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers (2002) argued that a well-organized party 
posed a significant effect on PRRWP support, however this is an area that is difficult to quan-
tify. I’ve decided to control for the number of vacant seats that were held, but not filled, by the 
Sweden Democrats. The reason behind this is that if the party got a set but did not have candi-
dates to fill the post, it would affect the party’s’ local credibility and thereby should negatively 
affect the support it gained in 2014. Finally, I’ve decided to include a measurement for partici-
pation which measure the change in voter participation between 2010 and 2014 in order to see 
if the outcome could be explained by that more people turned out to vote. As have been seen in 
the literature, the issues connected to the PRRWP also corresponded to make people more en-
gaged to vote. But not automatically correlate with an increased vote share for the PRRWP. 
(Arzheimer & Carter, 2006)  
 
3.2.4 Transformation 
The variables for education expenditure, local expenditure, number of students, elderly care 
expenditure, crime rate and disposable income were transformed to a standardized variable 
through SPSS. This were done in order to avoid the issue of absolute, high numbers which 
negatively affects the interpretability of the model. Due to the high values, the result ended with 
b= 0 with p<.001. The standardization was also done in order to attempt to reduce the number 
of omitted values, the variables which had high absolute numbers were standardized to reduce 
the size of the measurements. Unfortunately, this did not affect the leverage of the omitted 
values. The interpretation of a standardized variable is based on the formula 1-unit change =  
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one-unit change in standard deviation(sd) (see table of descriptive statistics for sd values) 
 
3.3 Method 
This paper is a quantitative study that will apply a multiple regression Ordinary least 
square(OLS) model. The benefit of this particular method is that it enables the measurement of 
relative significance between several variables in order to test a hypothesis. This is in line with 
the goal of this study as it attempts to test a new, previously untested hypothesis, and compare 
it to previous findings within the PRRWP field. Further, I will apply a forced input multiple 
regression method, incorporating several variables sorted only through categorical means. Thus 
differentiating from Hierarchical or stepwise multiple regressions which follows a specific or-
der (Fields, 2013: 322). As the topic of interest is the change between elections that is interest-
ing, it is deemed plausible that calculating the change by differentiating the years 2010 and 
2014 in most variables. I believe this to be a better method for this purpose then time series 
analysis which might be an alternative as the timeframe for the SD as a political party only goes 
back to 2006, meaning that a time series analysis would have few observations. This due to that 
even if we observe cases between election years, it makes no sense since party support data 
only is 100% reliable at elections as these are manifestations and expressions of support while 
pole, as an alternative between elections, become subjective to sample selection and subjective 
whims in opinion. Significance will be measured by the two-tailed p-test. The paper applies the 
conservative measurement of p < 0,05. The analysis will be divided into 5 models. Model one 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics summary         
variable name mean sd Min Max N 
SD_change, % 5.12(.13) 2.27 .01 12.31 276 
edu_exp, t/kr 237.77(307.45) 5107.85 -9300 27300 276 
local_exp, t/kr -14.85(211.19) 3508.70 -7650 12375 276 
student_average 2574.85(195.06 3240.73 165.5 33555.5 276 
elderly_exp, t/kr 128.52(531.55) 8830.83 -23768 35999.5 276 
elders_average, % 21.99(.23) 3.82 12.43 31.4 276 
immi_EU 2.66(.08 1.38 .5 7 276 
immi_non_EU 7.07(.24) 4.04 1.7 29 276 
edu_high, % 32.49(.58) 9.67 19.8 73.9 276 
edu_low, % 15.13(.23) 3.96 3.3 27 276 
unemp_2013, % 6.70(.12) 2.05 1.9 12.6 276 
crime_2013, c/100 000 inhabitants 9226.29(161.40) 2681.42 3486 19231 276 
disposable_income, t/kr inhabitants 206717.09(1386.72) 23038.00 171428 324903 276 
pop_rural, % .2563373 .14609198 .0 .68961 276 
income_inequality, 1 - 100 Gene, coefficient .38(.0021) .035 -31 .59 276 
GRP_dev t/kr inhabitants -92.08(7.46) 124.02 -265 842 276 
ND_1994, % 1.01(.06) 1.14 0 8.41 276 
Mean_toughness, scale,0.0 - 1.0 .35(.0045) .07 .15 .96 276 
Elec_P_change_2014, %  1.62(.066) 1.09 -2.3 5.2 276 
SD_empty_chair .25(.039) .64 0 6 276 
SD_chair 2.11(.11) 1.82 0 9 276 
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will include the three main variables, education and elderly care expenditures. The second will 
include the sociodemographic variables % of population above age 65 and the number of en-
rolled kids in education. The third model will add the demand-side variables to control for al-
ternative demand side explanation. The fourth model will include the supply-side variables to 
compare the two groups and their influence on the PRRWP vote share. The fifth model contains 
all variables at a perfect sample. Thus holding N at 290. 
 
4 Analysis 
This chapter covers, in order, pre-regression analyses to assure that the models fulfil the basic 
assumptions of multiple regression. The second half of the chapter contains the regression re-
sults and the main analysis. 
 
4.1 Pre-regression analysis. 
This section will measure the data in order to make sure that it fulfils the basic assumptions of 
the linear regression. This is done in order to strengthen the result and guarantee the quality of 
the findings as well as transparency between the writer and the reader to communicate the con-
scious decisions taken by the writer when sorting and managing the data.  
 
4.1.1 Normal distribution 
When we do a linear regression, it is useful to make sure that our sample is representative in 
the distribution of observations. The reason that we test this is to make sure that no observation 
has an abnormal influence on the regression. The impact of an interaction variable becomes 
more severe when we include cantered interaction terms. In the process of cantering a variable 
we deduct the variable from its mean but when we have outliers in the model, the mean will be 
different. Tus potentially inflating the effect of the interaction term. affected, But the process 
of omitting cases is not unproblematic. The opinions on if it is right to remove influential cases 
is hotly debated due to the question of the scientific community, in the hunt for generalizable 
results, inevitably also create bias.10 The form of our target group changes by the removal of 
our cases, which is important to keep in mind. By omitting cases, it is questionable to claim that 
we measure the entire population, yet neither is it correct to claim that we measure a sample. 
Instead, the result of omitting variable is that we now measure a normally distributed sample of 
the total population. (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009: 343-345) 
 
                                                          
10 The discussion between the two sides can be seen in the exchange between Kestilä‐Kekkonen & Söderlund, 
(2007). Arzheimer & Carter (2009) and Kestilä‐Kekkonen & Söderlund (2009, b) In their critique, Arzheimer & 
Carter criticise Kestilä‐Kekkonen & Söderlund in their decision to omit some cases.   
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When accounting for outliers, there are two 
forms of value measurement that becomes rel-
evant. The first is the leverage of individual 
cases on the overall model. For this purpose, 
four sets of values have been collected 
through analysing the data. First, to assess the overall impact on the  
regression, cantered leverage (
2∗𝑘+2
𝑛
) Cook’s distance (4 ÷ 𝑛), and studentized deleted resid-
ual (𝑆𝐷𝑅. > ±2). Additionally, in order to assess the impact of an observation on the regression 
coefficient. For this purpose, DFBeta values was taking into consideration (
2
√𝑛
).11 (Chen et al., 
2003) 
 
The second is to assure that the residual values of the model are normally distributed. The sec-
ond step is significantly more valuable as it is only 
when the residuals are normally distributed that we 
can get reliable P-values12 from the model. To meas-
ure this, we take into account the skew and kurtosis 
values of the unstandardized residuals. Additionally, 
we take into account the Shapiro-Wilk value to test 
for normality. To fulfil the assumption of normal dis-
tribution, we want skew and kurtosis to be as close to 
zero as possible while having the Shapiro-Wilk be in-
significant (p>.05. (Chen et al., 2003) The result of 
these tests have shown that we have several outliers, 
both in the observations and among the observations. 
As can be seen by table 1 in Appendix 2, the municipalities of Stockholm, Bjuv & Ljusnarsberg 
all show values that significantly alter the results of the model. These three have above the 
tolerated values in two of the three influence measures and DFBeta values above .8. This imply 
that the effect of these cases alone affect the regression coefficient 8 times as much as they in 
theory should (DFBeta= 0.1174). Initially, these cases are therefore omitted. Next we look at 
the residual statistics. In table 2, Appendix 2 we can see a summary of omitted variables, skew, 
kurtosis and the Shapiro-Wilk coefficient. In order to keep omitted variables to a minimum and 
avoid omitting unnecessarily, the process of selecting cases were done carefully picking only 
the highest or lowest values at a time, then recounting the unstandardized residual values to 
analyse the impact. The final value of N is 276. In the last round of controls for residual distri-
bution, the values suggested a worse fit, with Shapiro-Wilk dropping from .330 to .185. The 
final omitted value was therefore remitted.  
                                                          
11 For table of values, see table 1 in appendix 1.1. 
12 The P-value indicates the significant of the coefficient in the regression. In this case, a two- tailed significance 
test is used which means that a coefficient is significant when the p-value is smaller then, 0.05, or within the 
95% confidence interval. 
Table 2. Normal distribution measurements  
Studentized deleted R. >±2 
Cook’s D 0.1379 
Cantered Leverage value 0.1517 
DFBeta 0.1174 
Figure 2 model fit 
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4.1.2 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity 
When controlling for heteroscedasticity, the pre-
dicted values where mapped against the residuals in 
a simple scatterplot. The graph shows a fairly hetero-
scedastic picture of the full model. On the individual 
level, the number of students as well as the vote share 
of new Democracy in 1994 have homoscedasticity 
tendencies. Therefore, the variables were log trans-
formed. However, this had no effect on the distribu-
tion. It was therefore concluded that the two varia-
bles, as controls, had little effect on the findings or 
the overall model and were kept in its original form.13  
 
Normally, multicollinearity is only an issue when we include time series analysis or multiple 
variables that risk covariance. As the model contains two pairs of measurements (education and 
immigration) that measure different parts of the same population, it is good to make sure there 
is no multicollinearity. To do this, we check the tolerance and VIF values of each predic-
tor.14The highest observed VIF value is 7.778. The rule of thumb is that VIF-values above 10 
should be a case for worry. Tolerance measures the amount of variance a predictor can explain 
independently of others. As such, it also gives an indication to if a variable is redundant within 
the scope of the model. If the tolerance value is below .1 it has little impact on the dependent 
variable and may merit further investigation. The tolerance scores of the predictors range from 
.129 to .898. We can therefore conclude that the variables in the model independently explain 
enough of the variance to remain while no issues with collinearity were observed. 
 
4.1.3 Non-Linearity and independence of errors 
To ensure that there are no issues with inflating errors and assure that the assumption of inde-
pendent errors is affirmed. A Durbin-Watson test were made. The value for the full model is 
1.898. The ideal score is 2 but the value can range from 0 to 4. As our score is close to 2, there 
should be no issues with dependent errors.  
 
All predictors in the model is numeric and follows either a scale or a set of nominal values with 
a linear function. To ensure that all variables fulfil the linear assumption all variables vas 
mapped in partial plots against the change in vote share for the Sweden Democrats. The plots 
show the linear relationship with 95% confidence intervals.15 The plots suggest no issues with 
linearity. 
 
4.2 Results 
The regression-table is set as a summary of the results of the 5 models identified above. The 
numbers represent the unstandardized(b) beta coefficient. As previously defined, model 5 in-
cludes the regression at full sample. 
                                                          
13 Individual scatterplots are available in appendix 2. 
14 For a full table of Tolerance and VIF values, see appendix 2 
15 For the full set of partial plots, see appendix 2. 
Figure 3 full model, residual plot 
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Table 3: Regression table, DV - Difference in SD vote, 2010/2014, %     
variable name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
edu_exp, t/kr -.541***(.141) -.683***(.139) -.547***(.129) -.401***(.121) -.592***(163) 
local_exp, t/kr -.021 (.138) -.039(.133) -.096(124) -.055(.115) .047(.150) 
elderly_exp, t/kr -.349*(.143) -.514***(.143) -.390*(.154) -.328*(.143) -.294(.190) 
student_average  -.482*(.201) -.153(.234) -.202(.222) -.076(.200) 
elders_average, %  .112**(.043) -.078).057) -.033(.053) .078(.070) 
immi_EU 
  .189(.113) .210(.111) .074(.147) 
immi_non_EU   -.120*(.057) -.030(.054) .040(.071) 
edu_high, %   -.028(.032) -.032(.029) -.030(.039) 
edu_low, %   .183**(.059) .156**(.055) .160*(.072) 
unemp_2013, %   .157(.098) .085(.095) .160(.127) 
crime_2013, c/100 000 inhabitants   .212(.191) .044(.182) .335(.237) 
Disposable_income, t/kr inhabitants   -.139(.278) .069(.259) .383(.341) 
income_inequality, 1 - 100 Gene, 
coefficient   .898(5.254) .504(4.891) -195(6.597) 
pop_rural, %   .690(1.307 .217(1.204) -.055(1.612) 
GRP_dev t/kr inhabitants   .000(.001) -9.49(.001) -.002(.001) 
ND_1994, %    -.049(.096) -.149(.130) 
Mean_toughness, scale,0.0 - 1.0    .417(1.642) -.102(2.182) 
Elec_P_change_2014, %    .643***(.114) .789***(.151) 
SD_empty_chair    .347*(.167) -.014(.217) 
SD_chair    .208**(.080) .034).104) 
Constant 5.125***(.130) 2.638**(.959) 3.735(2.269) 1.673(2.157) -.898(2.893) 
R² .109 .187 .380 .488 .352 
N 276 276 276 276 290 
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. unstandardized coefficient, Standard errors within parentheses. Data: SCB 2015, KOLADA 2015, SIRIS 2014, Arbetsför-
medlingen 2015, BRÅ 2015, 
 
In model 1, which only contains the welfare expenditure variables. Of the three, education have 
the strongest effect at b -.541 at p<.001. The cost of locals does not show any significant. El-
derly care funding is significant with b-.349 at p<.05. Both of the significant variables have a 
negative connotation, suggesting that the relationship follows the prediction of H1 and H2. For 
every .541 standard deviation decrease in municipal funding for education, SD increases their 
support by 1 percentile in the municipality. Elderly care shows the same relationship. But then 
at a .349 standard deviation decrease in municipal funding increases SD support by 1 percentile. 
 
Looking at model 2. The inclusion of the socio-demographic variables did not change the effect 
of education expenditure which remains at p<.001. The student variable itself were significant 
at p<.05. The inclusion of students and elders increased the significant of elderly care to p<.001. 
This could be explained by the inclusion of the percentile of the population in the municipality 
that were above the age of 65 which were significant at p<.01. A plausible explanation for this 
change in sig. value for elderly care is that for municipalities with higher average population of  
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seniors, the role of the elderly care system becomes the core feature of the welfare services that 
most people experience. This may then have higher effects on the generation of distrust towards 
the political system and a rise in perceived economic threat which in turn would reduce gener-
alized trust and allow for PRRWP exploitation in line with the second mechanism of welfare 
provisions.   
 
In model 3, education expenditure remains at p<.001 but drops from b -.683 to -.547. local 
expenditure remains insignificant. Relative to the inclusion of other demand side variables, both 
students and elders drop below the level of significant. Elderly care remains significant but 
drops to p<.05. Of the predicted effects of the other factors that have been found to sometime 
support the PRRWP. Only two pass the threshold of significands. In line with Rydgren & Ruth 
(2011/2013) the percentage of the population that is from outside the EU/EFTA is negatively  
 
correlated to PRRWP support. It shows a b of -.120 at p<.05. This is against most of the research 
on the PRRWP but is in line with the findings of Vanhoutte & Hooghe (2013). The second 
demand side control to be significant is the % of inhabitants with primary education or lower. 
It has a b of.183 at p<.01. The data thus suggest that the higher the number of inhabitants with 
up to primary education, the higher the support is for the PRRWP. This is in line both with 
previous research that suggest this group 
to be more likely to support the PRRWP 
(Arzheimer & Carter, 2006), but also the 
research that suggest that this group is 
particularly vulnerable to perceived 
threats and to the ideological campaigns 
of advertisement in particular, and the 
PRRWP in particular (Schmuk & Mat-
thes, 2014). However, due to the nature of 
this study, the causality of each particular 
explanation cannot be concluded and as 
such, the exact reason as to why this vari-
able is significant is only speculative, not 
definite.  
 
Relative to other factors, expected predictors such as rural population, crime rate and unem-
ployment were insignificant. The percentile of population from within the EU/EFTA had the 
predicted positive relationship to PRRWP support predicted by Rydgren & Ruth (2013) but 
ended up with at p=.095. Above the threshold for significands. None of the three variables that 
measured economic factors showed significands either. While disappointing, the data suggests 
that the “pure” welfare chauvinist argument that PRRWP support could be explained by the 
fear of the wealthy to lose out on what they have (Kitschelt, 1995). Nor does the perception that 
income inequality can explain the function of why PRRWPs rise in popularity in some areas. It 
should however be noted that over all, Sweden score fairly well on the gene coefficients. This 
Figure 4 Scatterplot of gene-coefficient and SD_change 
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is particularly prevalent if we refer to figure 4 which show a simple scatter on the observations 
of gene-coefficient set against SD_change. As we can see, almost all observations are clustered 
between .35 and .4. It is possible to assume that an analysis in country with a bigger variation 
in income inequality may show different results. We should thus not exclude the plausibility 
that this, or any of the other findings, are due to the influence of the empirical setting. 
 
The result of the GRP variable is unfortunately suffering from a miscalculated absolute number 
effect. As such, it is difficult to interpret the results or draw any conclusions from the findings. 
The significands of this variable is however, far from the threshold at the moment which may 
suggest that even if transformed, the variable would not reach significands. 
 
In model 4, we add the supply side variables to compare the influence between supply and 
demand side factors on the main IV. Of the two IV’s, only education expenditure remains sig-
nificant at p<.001 but drops to b -.401 from -.547. Elderly care remains at p<.05 with b changing 
from -.390 to -.328. A significant factor to consider when we analyse the main IVs are that they 
both are standardized variables. A 1 unit change therefore mean one change in the IV. As the 
stepwise change in each model have shown, the b for both variables have decreased with the 
inclusion of other demand and supply side factors. This would normally mean that the effect 
drops slightly relative to others. However, in this case, a drop in the value of the standardized 
variable means that one percentile increase in SD support is gained from a smaller decrease in 
welfare funding. As such, with the inclusion of each new model, the welfare variable becomes 
more sensitive to the funding received by the government. In model two, one increase in SD 
equated to education expenditure at -3488.6616 from the national average. In model 4, the same 
relationship corresponded to -2048.25 from the national average. The only other demand side 
variable that remained significant were primary education at p<.01. 
 
On the supply side, the vote shares of New Democracy and the mainstream party position on 
immigration both lack significands. The result of ND is in line with the findings of Dahlström 
& Sundell (2012) which also failed to find any significant relationship. On the other hand, 
mainstream party position is against what they found. It is however highly plausible that the 
effect of their data is offset by the distance between when the data were collected before the 
election 2010 and the results of the change between 2010 and 2014. As such, the findings, while 
informed by part positions in 2010, cannot be considered as evidence of their position between 
2010 and 2014.  
 
The internal supply side variables both held up in the regression. Party presence, or the number 
of chairs gained by SD in 2010, were positively correlated with increased SD support at p<.01. 
However, opposite to the theoretical argument. The variable that measured party reliability, or 
the number of seats that remained empty during the period, were also positively correlated to 
increased SD support at p<.05. Why the relationship is positive is difficult to explain, however 
if we compare it with model 5, we see that while insignificant, the direction turns from positive 
to negative. We might therefore consider that the effect of party reliance is affected by the 
selection of omitted variables in a way which may have affected the coefficient. 
 
Finally, we note that the effect of election participation is highly significant at p.<001 with a 
positive correlation to PRRWP support. Based on the findings of Arzheimer & Carter (2006) 
we could potentially connect the change to a growing popularity of the PRRWP which make a 
                                                          
16 This relationship was calculated by multiplying the SD of edu_exp, 5107.85 times the b of edu-exp in 
model two, .683. 
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vote for them more likely to count over all. It is also plausible to assume that the issues identi-
fied by Arzheimer & Carter as PRRWP issues, make people more likely to vote. Another pos-
sible explanation is that immigration has gained increasing issue salience over the last few 
years. If both politicians and the media draws connections between the two, the voters that 
perceive immigration as a threat could increase which in turn would increase the PRRWP vote 
as well. 
 
If we refer to model 5, the perfect sample model. We can see education expenditure remains at 
p<.001. All other variables, except for election participation(p<.001) and primary educa-
tion(p<.05), feel below the threshold in this model. We can also see that the direction of the 
relationship changes for some of the insignificant variables. However, if we turn to the R², we 
can see that between model 4 and 5, we lose 13.6% of the explained variance, thus suggesting 
that the model fit of the perfect sample is weaker than the normally distributed sample. 
 
In the other models, R² successively increases from 10.9% in model 1 to 18.7% when including 
students and elders in model 2. With the inclusion of demand side variables in model 3, the 
total variance explained were 38%, thus an increase of 19.3%. The supply side variable sin 
mode 4 added another 10.8% to a total of 48.8% of the total variance explained.  
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper were to better understand how the welfare state affected the electoral support for 
the populist radical right-wing parties(PRRWP). In order to do this, I identified two mechanisms through 
which uneven welfare provision could increase the potential support for the PRRWP, and how the 
PRRWP in turn could potentially utilize these potentialities to form a strategy that would increase their 
support. As such, I identified partial welfare as welfare where not everyone is catered to equality. To 
test the hypothesis, I selected Sweden as a case. I argued that the Sweden Democrats were a part of the 
PRRWP group, both through the use of academic literature and by referring to the party’s political man-
ifesto. I argue that specifically because the link between national identity and the welfare state is strong 
in Sweden in correlation to that everyone should be treated equally, Sweden makes a good case to test 
the hypothesis. If there is no variation in the welfare system, then there would be no correlation between 
the welfare provisions and the PRRWP. To account for the empirical setting, and the role of the munic-
ipality, I constructed two operationalization’s of the main hypothesis. H1 suggest that when educational 
funding is below the national average, the support for the PRRWP increases. H2 state that when elderly 
care funding is below the national average, the support for the PRRWP increases. 
 
In the regression, support was found for both H1 and H2, where the results of H1 in particular remained 
at p<.001 through all 5 models. These findings support the theory that partial welfare may correlate to 
increased support for the PRRWP. I believe that future studies should incorporate the variance in welfare 
expenditures. Particularly on the subnational level where the variance may be greater and where the 
impact on the individual is greater than in cross-country comparison. It is important to note that I con-
sider partial welfare to be a mechanism for changes in trust and for creating potential beneficial contexts 
where the PRRWP can gain increased support. As such, while it might be possible to conclude that I 
argue that partial welfare causes changes in policy preference, this is not the case. As such, while I might 
be criticised for not including, for example, the vote shares of the mainstream parties, this would have 
little meaning. That said, future studies could potentially look into the link between partial welfare and 
policy positions. But in order to do so, individual level survey data should be used. To draw a conclusion 
related to policy positions based on this study would potentially be contra intuitive, but foremost, it 
would be to commit an ecological fallacy to draw individual level conclusions based on aggregated 
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structure level data. Other avenues for future studies could be to analyse other forms of welfare institu-
tions. Healthcare services, if entangled into a function separated between the regional and the municipal 
level, could add further insight into the impact of public welfare. Another avenue would be to dig deeper 
into welfare provisions to find out at what point people perceive welfare to be partial. Most of my argu-
ments could be criticised for being highly theoretical. Future studies could aid in analysing how partial-
ity is perceived, if it is perceived at all. Is it based on interaction or is the explanation closer to the issue 
salience argument where it becomes an issue once it reaches the political and/or media debate.  
 
Most other findings in the regression were expected, except for the effect of party reliability which 
results, opposite to expectation, were positively correlated to PRRWP support. It is possible that the 
effect of the variable would be different depending on which outliers were deleted. As were shown in 
model 5, the variable there had the expected correlation but below the threshold for significands. Over-
all, better measurements could potentially have affected the number of removed outliers. Even if an 
effort were made to replace the absolute values in the model with standardized variables, the same out-
liers still remained. It could also be argued that there are some issues of homoscedasticity in two of the 
variables, however, even after attempting to a log transformation to assure normal distribution, the ob-
servations still clustered in almost the same way. As the variables were controls only, they were kept 
without changes.  
 
Another limitation of this paper is the assumption of trust as an inherent variable. While it Is not included 
in the regression I’ve continuously referred to it through the theory and literature review. An inclusion 
of social trust relative to the PRRWP would be interesting and have not been able to find a paper where 
it is done. However, it is not entirely unproblematic. Most social trust studies are done by social surveys 
and carried out by universities or other institutions. This is fine, however, one of the core mechanics that 
I identified is the anti-establishment position and a lack of trust in public institutions. The question is if 
the survey will be able to capture this group of people, as it, at least in my mind, would be logical for 
these individuals with low trust in institutions not to be willing to take part in such a survey. This would 
then, even before the analysis, mean that the data is biased. This is not completely unfunded speculation, 
if we refer to the SOM election participation survey on the values of SD voters, we can see that the 
number of respondents continuously drops for each year. (Sannersted, 2014) 
 
Over all, I believe that this thesis has aided in improving the understanding of how partiality in the 
welfare system can create increased support for the PRRWP. Considering the significands of both IVs, 
the data definitely suggested that they are interlinked. I hope that future studies can incorporate these 
findings and continue to incorporate generalized trust into the field of PRRWP research. 
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Appendix 1. 
Table 4. Variable breakdown   
code 
meassur-
ment variable Source 
SD_change 
% change 
in vote 
share 
The change in vote share for the Sweden democrats 
between 2010 and 2014 
the Swedish Election Author-
ity 
edu_exp 
thousand 
crowns per 
student 
the mean difference in primary education funding be-
tween 2010 and 2014 relative to the national average 
The Swedish National 
Agency for Education/SIRIS 
local_exp 
thousand 
crowns per 
student 
the mean expenditures on school building expenses 
between 2010 and 2013 relative to the national aver-
age. 
The Swedish National 
Agency for Education/SIRIS 
student_average 
number of 
students 
The average number of students enrolled in primary 
education between 2010 and 2014 
The Swedish National 
Agency for Education/SIRIS 
elderly_exp 
thousand 
crowns per 
inhabitant, 
65+ 
The mean elderly care expenditures between 2010 
and 2013 relative to the national average 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
elders_average 
% of in-
habitants 
65+ The % of the population above 65 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
immi_EU 
% of popu-
lation 
The number of immigrants from within the 
EU/EFTA that lives in a municipality Statistics Sweden 
immi_non_EU 
% of popu-
lation 
The number of immigrants from outside the 
EU/EFTA that lives in a municipality Statistics Sweden 
edu_high,  % of popu-
lation The % of population with higher education 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
edu_low % of popu-
lation The % of pupulation with primary education 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
unemp_2013 & of popu-
lation 
The % of pupulation in open unemployment or in ac-
tive unemployment programms 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
crime_2013,  
crime per 
100 000 
inhabitants The local crime rate 
The Swedish National Coun-
cil for Crime Prevention/Brå  
disposable_income 
thousand 
crowns per 
inhabitant The average income level in an area 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
income_inequality 
1 - 100 
Gene, co-
efficient Income inequality within the municipality 
Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions/Ko-
lada 
Pop_rural,  
Percentage 
of popula-
tion 
The percentage of the population that lives outside of 
the city centre. Statistics Sweden 
GRP_dev  
thousand 
crowns per 
inhabitants 
Gross Regional Product or the economic develop-
ment of the municipal economy Swedish Statistics 
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ND_1994 
%  vote 
share The vote share for the New Democracy party in 1994 Dahlström & Sundell(2012) 
Mean_toughness 
 scale,0.0 - 
1.0 
Mean toughness on immigrants in the mainstream 
parties Dahlström & Sundell(2012) 
Elec_P_change_20
14  
% change 
in voter 
turnout 
Change in election participation between 2010 and 
2014 Statistics Sweden 
SD_empty_chair 
number of 
empty 
chairs 
The amount of seats without someone to occupy 
them in the municipal council 
the Swedish Election Author-
ity 
SD_chair 
number of 
owned seat 
in city 
council 
The number of seats won by the Sweden Democrats 
in the 2010 elections Statistics Sweden 
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Appendix 2: 
Normal distribution 
M_code 
Stud. Del. 
Residual. Cook's D. C.L.Value. 
DFBeta. 
DV 
DFBeta. 
L.IV. 
428 2.620     .05542 .38214 
2582 2.424   -.16823 -.24571 
1499 2.302   -.12279 .26447 
1260 -6.711 .208  -.28132 .88730 
1864 3.785 .113  -.54006 .92433 
561 3.536 .022  -.11975 -.37822 
834 3.241 .021  .10845 .31136 
1782 3.026 .025  -.09009 .40690 
2560 2.852 .028  -.18868 --44880 
604 -2.649 .022  -.17155 .42046 
180   .056 .649 .03122 .87687 
2425   .053 .204 -.61115 -.53316 
184   .034 .344 .12541 .47642 
484    .334 .03181 .23214 
162    .330 .01480 .09832 
127    .199 .07187 --30667 
1281    .198 .00111 .-22820 
1480    .198 .00039 -.01679 
2084    .196 .01063 .14899 
1765    .182 .02003 -.43501 
            
bench-
mark >±2 0.1379 
0.1517 
0.1174 0.1174 
 
Residuals 
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Residual statistics 
Case selection by residuals         
Roun
d 
n/miss-
ing/total 
skewness Kurtosis 
Shapiro-
Wilk sig. 
removed 
cases 
Municipal ID, residual value in pa-
renthesis 
1 284(3)287 .648(.144) 1.647(.287) .000 3 561(7.9), 834(7.1), 604(-6.0),  
2 281(3)284 .507(.145) .953(.288) .001 3 1782(6.9), 428(6.1), 2560(6.03) 
3 277(4)281 .303(.145) .436(.290) .030 4 
2582(5.6), 682(5.5), 2361(-4.8), 
1491(-4.6) 
4 276(1)277 .269(146) .017(.296) .291 1 1499(5.3) 
5 275(1)276 .215(.147) -.121(.292) .330 1 1430(4.6) 
6 276(+1)275 .182(.147) -.194(.293) .185 +1 added 1430 again 
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Figure 6 Immigrants from EU/EFTA 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Edu_exp Figure 5 Local_exp 
Figure 8 Number of students Figure 7 Elderly_exp 
Figure 5 % of population above 65 
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Figure 7 Immigrants from outside EU/EFTA Figure 8 % of population with higher education 
Figure 9 % of population with primary education or lower Figure 10 % of population unemployed 
Figure 11 Reported crime Figure 12 Disposable income 
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Figure 13 Gene coefficient of income inequality Figure 14 Rural population 
Figure 15 GRP Figure 16 New Democracy, 1994 
Figure 17 Toughness on immigration Figure 18 election participation change, 2010-2014 
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Multicollinearity 
 
 
variable name Collinearity Statistics 
  Tolerance VIF 
Z_edu_exp .702 1.425 
Z_local_exp .824 1.214 
Z_student_average .390 2.561 
Z_elderly_exp .504 1.984 
elders_average .256 3.910 
immi_EU .446 2.242 
immi_non_EU .215 4.660 
edu_high .129 7.778 
edu_low .223 4.493 
unemp_2013 .275 3.643 
Z_crime_2013 .343 2.912 
Z_disposable_income .152 6.586 
income_inequality .348 2.871 
Pop_rural .336 2.980 
GRP_dev .622 1.608 
ND_1994 .859 1.165 
Mean_toughness .687 1.456 
Elec_P_change_2014 .664 1.505 
SD_empty_chair .898 1.114 
SD_chair .483 2.069 
 
  
Figure 19 SD, empty chairs Figure 20 SD municipal council chairs, 2010 
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Linearity plots. 
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